

# **BARINGO COUNTY**

**Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment**  
for Food Security Safety Nets and Emergency  
Preparedness and Response

**November 2015**




**World Food Programme**




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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The World Food Programme Kenya has received generous support from the Government of Sweden to work with the Government of Kenya and county governments to strengthen their capacities in social protection, emergency preparedness and response, and resilience building for the period January 2015 to December 2017. The partnership is entitled “Enhancing Complementarity and Strengthening Capacity for Sustainable Resilience Building in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands”.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CCC</b>	Core capacity characteristics
<b>CIDP</b>	County Integrated Development Plan
<b>CSG</b>	County Steering Group
<b>EDE</b>	Common Programme Framework for Ending Drought Emergencies
<b>HGI</b>	Hunger governance indicator
<b>HSC</b>	Humanitarian supply chain
<b>NDMA</b>	National Drought Management Authority
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

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## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this capacity gaps and needs assessment is to identify the capacity needs of Baringo County Government and supportive institutions in designing, managing and implementing food security-related safety nets, preparedness and responses to emergencies and to recommend capacity development interventions for the identified needs.

Kenya has suffered recurrent episodes of drought that have resulted in emergencies rendering large populations in the arid and semi-arid lands food insecure and reliant on relief food assistance. Occasional floods, landslides, pestilence and community conflicts are other causal factors that have prompted emergency responses in Kenya in the past. During such emergencies, livelihoods have been lost and the poorest have been forced to sell productive assets, take children out of school or adopt other negative coping strategies that can reinforce dependency and poverty, delay recovery, compromise household resilience and contribute to recurring crises.

The World Food Programme (WFP) in its 2014–2017 strategic plan sets out a goal focused on strengthening the capacity of governments and regional organizations to prepare for, assess and respond to shocks. When national, local and regional authorities are able to prepare effectively for emergencies, they can cut response times and significantly lower the human and economic cost of natural disasters and other crises.<sup>1</sup>

The introduction of devolution in March 2013 was the most significant change in governance in Kenya since independence. According to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, national and county governments are distinct and interdependent. Implementation of the Common Programme Framework for Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE)<sup>2,3</sup> is a shared responsibility of the national and county governments.

County governments are on the frontline, protecting populations affected by food security hazards like drought, floods and landslides, and they also have resources to finance investment in both risk reduction and timely disaster response.

### What is an Emergency?

WFP defines emergencies as urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event or series of events have occurred which cause human suffering or imminently threaten human lives or livelihoods – or which dislocate the life of a community on an exceptional scale – and which the government concerned has not the means to remedy.

<sup>1</sup> For example, according to UNDP, every dollar spent on disaster prevention saves four dollars of disaster loss. See UNDP. 2010. *Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery*. New York.

<sup>2</sup> Government of Kenya. 2015. *Common Programme Framework for Ending Drought Emergencies*. Nairobi. Government of Kenya.

<sup>3</sup> The Common Programme Framework for Ending Drought Emergencies is the product of a series of discussions between the Government of Kenya and its development partners that took place between October 2013 and August 2014. It represents the first phase of a ten-year programme to end drought emergencies by 2022. The framework has three areas of emphasis: eliminating the conditions that perpetuate vulnerability, enhancing the productive potential of the region, and strengthening institutional capacity for effective risk management.

According to the EDE, county governments have already demonstrated that they are making a difference and that the impact of the dry seasons in 2013/14 would have been much worse had counties not taken steps to maintain boreholes, truck water and manage disease outbreaks. A number of counties, including Baringo, are in the process of enhancing their capacities for disaster risk management. This work is closely related to county and national safety nets. These counties are facing challenges relating to legislation as well as the institutional, technical and financial capacities required to implement planned preparedness and response interventions and safety nets. Kenya's National Capacity Building Framework<sup>4</sup> envisioned the need to provide support to county governments to enable them to effectively perform their functions; therefore, the technical cooperation between WFP and county governments is based on the understanding that investing in appropriate interventions for capacity development to tackle hunger would also contribute to the acceleration of the implementation of devolution, which places emphasis on the quality of goods and services delivered.

WFP Kenya has received generous support from the Government of Sweden to work with the Government of Kenya and county governments to strengthen their capacities in social protection, disaster risk management and resilience building for the period January 2015–December 2017. The partnership is entitled “Enhancing Complementarity and Strengthening Capacity for Sustainable Resilience Building in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands”, and focuses on (1) supporting strategic coordination of social protection at the national level, (2) capacity development for newly devolved (county) structures, and (3) transitioning support for cash-for-asset beneficiaries to national and county governments.

Baringo is one of the counties that has expressed interest in cooperating with WFP to support its capacity to prepare for and respond to food insecurity in normal times and during emergencies.

Before an adequate capacity support programme can be elaborated, a complete understanding of existing capacities and gaps is needed. This understanding will help focus resources on needs and areas where the support can have the maximum impact. This capacity gaps and needs assessment is the first step in a process of collaboration between WFP and Baringo County Government. It serves to assess existing capacities and agree where capacity development investments can be made in line with the county's priorities.

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<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Devolution and Planning, 2013. *National Capacity Building Framework*. Nairobi. Government of Kenya.

This report summarizes the results of the assessment for Baringo County. It will form the basis of a specific capacity support programme that will be formalized through a cooperation agreement between WFP and the county government and will be implemented over the subsequent two years. The capacity gaps and needs assessment will also form the baseline against which the results of the following two years of capacity support will be measured.

## Capacity Assessment Concepts

Among other sources, the United Nations Development Group Capacity Assessment Methodology User's Guide<sup>5</sup> provides useful definitions for a number of the terms used in this report:

- **Capacity** is the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully.
- **Capacity development** is the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create and maintain capacity over time.
- **Capacity assessment** is the identification of capacity assets and needs at national and local levels.

A capacity assessment framework provides a structure to:


- mobilize and design the capacity assessment by adapting the assessment framework to each context, determining how the assessment will be conducted and costing the capacity assessment exercise;
- conduct the capacity assessment to understand existing capacity assets;
- summarize and interpret the capacity assessment to construct a support tool for relevant county development methodologies.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Development Group. 2008. *Capacity Assessment Methodology User's Guide 2008-2014*. <http://undg.org/docs/8947/UNDGCapacity-Assessment-User-Guide-Feb-2008-FINAL.doc>



## 1

# METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT



This capacity gaps and needs assessment primarily serves to inform the development of specific capacity support strategies and programmes between the Baringo County and WFP.

The capacity gaps and needs assessment was a highly participatory process, where the county government took the lead role, with WFP acting as a facilitator. The process took place over two workshops held in July in Baringo and in September 2015 in Nakuru. In these workshops, government-led technical teams were formed, which discussed two themes: emergency preparedness and response (including early warning food security assessments and humanitarian supply chain management) and safety nets.

For both areas, WFP had prepared detailed question guides, which probe into the current level of capacity in the county

with respect to five areas of hunger governance:<sup>6</sup>

- policy and legislative environment
- effective and accountable institutions
- financing and strategic planning
- programme design and management
- continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice

The county leadership established technical teams to work through the prepared question guides with facilitation by WFP.

<sup>6</sup> **Hunger governance** is defined as the obligation of nations to their citizens to guarantee freedom from hunger, under-nutrition and harms caused by disasters by formulating conducive legislation and policies, strengthening effective institutions, supporting strategic national development plans, and investing in sustainable hunger solution measures and clearly established parameters for handing over such measures to nationally managed systems.



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These teams addressed the relevant questions, provided a wide range of relevant county-level documents, identified scores for the present level of capacity in each area, and tentatively discussed priority areas for capacity support.

This report starts with a general description of Baringo County. It then summarizes the capacity assessment (jointly for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response), and proposes a number of specific capacity support interventions.

The section Methodology and Summary of Baseline Capacity Indicator Scores explains

in more detail the method of identifying and calculating the county capacity indicator baseline and presents the results of the Baringo capacity gaps and needs assessment.

The matrices with the detailed question guides, team discussions – supplemented by information from a desk review of national and county policy and legal documents and relevant data – and scores are attached as annexes 1, 2 and 3 to this report.



## 2

DESCRIPTION  
OF BARINGO<sup>7</sup>

Baringo is situated in the Rift Valley region. It borders Turkana and Samburu to the north, Laikipia to the east, Nakuru and Kericho to the south, Uasin Gishu to the southwest, and Elgeyo-Marakwet and West Pokot to the west. Baringo covers an area of 11,015 km<sup>2</sup> divided into six sub-counties: Mogotio, Koibatek, Marigat, Baringo Central, Baringo North and East Pokot.

The 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census recorded the population of Baringo as 555,561. This population has been growing at an annual rate of 3.3 percent, which is above the national average of 3 percent. East Pokot sub-county has the highest population of 133,189, followed by the town of Eldama Ravine with a population of 105,273, while the least populous sub-counties are Mogotio and Marigat.

Baringo has four livelihood zones: mixed farming (43 percent of population), pastoral (31 percent), agropastoral (22 percent) and irrigated cropping (4 percent) (Figure 1). Approximately 90 percent of the population is estimated to depend on pastoral livestock production.

The county varies in altitude between 700 and 3,000 metres above sea level. The climate varies from humid highland to arid lowland. Overall, Baringo is classified as arid, as it receives an annual rainfall of 350 mm to 600 mm in the drier lowlands and 1,000 mm to 1,500 mm in the highlands. While Koibatek is a highland zone, most of East Pokot, Baringo Central, Baringo South,



**Figure 1 Map of Baringo: livelihood zones and sub-counties**

Baringo North and Mogotio are arid or semi-arid. The rains fall twice annually, the long rains from March to May and the short rains from August to November. The rains are more unreliable in the arid areas, with an intra-year coefficient of variation of more than 50 percent throughout the county, and with peaks of more than 80 percent in the driest part. Despite the prevalence of arid conditions, 165 km<sup>2</sup> of the county is covered by surface water, with Lake Baringo covering an area of 130 km<sup>2</sup>, Lake Bogoria, 34 km<sup>2</sup>, and Lake Kamnarok, 1 km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> This section draws information from the following references: *Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2014* (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2015); *Baringo County First County Integrated Development Plan 2013–2017* (Baringo County Government, 2015); *Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2014* (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2015); *the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census* (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010); and *the 2015 Long Rains Season Assessment Report* (Kenya Food Security Steering Group, August 2015).

The erratic rainfall patterns also affect these key water resources.

Approximately 45 percent of the land area is either too steep (Tugen Hills) or too arid (areas around Lake Baringo and the eastern part of the county, i.e. Nginyang and some parts of Kerio Valley) for crop cultivation. Approximately 2,500 km<sup>2</sup> of the county's territory is arable, but only 8.8 percent of this is used. The average farm size is 2.5 ha. In the southern part of the county, namely Koibatek, land is demarcated with title deeds, while in the northern part, East Pokot, it is managed communally.

## Hazards

Baringo is prone to natural and man-made hazards, including drought, floods, forest and bush fires, diseases, landslides and conflict.

Extreme weather conditions have increased in frequency. Episodes of torrential rain, prolonged dry spells and heat waves are becoming unpredictable and severe. The loss of forest cover over the years has led to flash floods, landslides and gully erosion, which are especially noticeable in East Pokot, Mogotio, Kerio Valley, Arabal and lower parts of Koibatek. The deposition of silt and debris into the lakes, compounded by the increased after-storm discharges, has led to a rise in lake water levels, which has in turn caused population displacement and loss of agricultural land and infrastructure. Populations have moved into areas unsuitable for cultivation, undermining livelihoods in the long run. This is accompanied by disease outbreaks from the increase the risk of waterborne and vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and diarrhoea.

Water shortages for human and livestock consumption are prevalent in the arid and semi-arid areas, especially the Lake Baringo-Bogoria basin, parts of Kerio Valley, Mogotio, the western slopes of Ng'elecha (Mochongoi) and the entire area of East Pokot (Kollowa to Tangelbei). This is caused by low rainfall and cyclic droughts.

Social and political conflicts also affect Baringo. Cattle rustling and conflict over grazing resources such as pasture, browse and water, is frequent.

## Food Security and Hunger

The 2015 Long Rains Assessment showed that the pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihood zones were classified as stressed (IPC<sup>8</sup> phase 2),<sup>9</sup> while the marginal mixed farming, mixed farming and irrigated farming livelihood zones were classified as minimal (IPC phase 1).<sup>10</sup> Although the performance in 2013 and 2014 was mixed, the food security situation improved in 2015. Currently, about 6,500 people are food insecure, compared to February 2015 when 59,600 people were found to be acutely food insecure. In 2014, the rainy seasons performed poorly and 72,600 people were acutely food insecure, compared to 21,300 people in 2013.

In September 2015, only 3 percent of the population had poor levels of food consumption, compared to 8 percent during a similar period in 2014. Thirty-three percent had borderline food consumption, down from 39 percent in 2014. More households (64 percent) had an acceptable food consumption score in September 2015 compared to 2014, when 53 percent had an acceptable score. According to the County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013–2017, 3 percent of households normally eat one meal, 21 percent two meals, and 72 percent three meals a day.

While 26 percent of children are stunted nationally, according to the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey, the rate in Baringo is slightly higher at 29.5 percent. The global acute malnutrition rate in the county is 6.9 percent, as compared to the national average of 4 percent.

The Baringo County Drought Contingency Plan indicates that the county has experienced recurrent severe droughts triggering food assistance interventions that target the affected households.

8 Integrated (food security) phase classification.

9 Households are able to afford minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies.

10 Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.

## 3

CAPACITY  
ASSESSMENT

During the capacity assessment workshops, different teams discussed and assessed capacity gaps and needs for safety nets and for emergency preparedness and response, and identified separate capacity scores for both areas and for each of five hunger governance indicators. This enabled the most relevant questions to be discussed with the right county officials in an efficient way. In addition, discussing questions separately – even though they were closely related – provided a triangulation of responses, which were then compared at the final plenary sessions of the two workshops.

All details concerning the specific questions discussed and the scores identified for separate areas can be found in the complete matrices in annexes 1, 2 and 3.

### Hunger Governance

#### Indicator 1: Policy and Legislative Environment

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 enshrines a number of fundamental rights and freedoms in its Bill of Rights. With respect to safety nets, these include the right to life (Art. 26), the right to human dignity (Art. 28) as well as economic and social rights (Art. 43). In particular, Art. 43 foresees that every person has the right (c) to be free from hunger and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; and (e) to social security. Not least, Art. 43 (3) prescribes that the state shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their dependents. The fourth schedule of the constitution (allocation of specific tasks to the national government and county governments) does not specify which level of government is responsible for social

protection, but both national and county governments are responsible for disaster management. The notion is that counties will act as first responders to emergencies, while the national government sets standards (e.g. assessment and targeting methodologies, beneficiary registration) and steps in with additional resources in case an emergency affects a share of the population above a certain threshold. This threshold has not yet been defined.

#### Emergency Preparedness and Response

The policy and legislative framework for emergency preparedness and response in Baringo is considered to be strong when it comes to preparing for and responding to droughts but not when it comes to other hazards. Most of the policies remain in draft stage, which hinders their operationalization.

As emergency preparedness and response is a function of both the national and the county government, coherence between national and county policies is needed. In fact, enacting county policies in the absence of or without clear coordination with the national framework may undermine results.

The County Government Act stipulates that in the absence of an existing national law, the county can legislate to aid its operations. Some of the reasons cited for the slow process to pass legislation included lack of technical assistance in drafting legislation, and all counties relying on a centralized government printer in printing policies, bills and gazette notices. There exist opportunities for working with partners, who have technical staff who can assist in drafting disaster policy and setting up responsible units, e.g. the Kenya Red Cross.

A key national policy document that regulates county government emergency

preparedness and response is the Devolution Policy.<sup>11</sup> It will, importantly, clarify the division of responsibilities between the central and the county governments, particularly as regards the specific trigger levels for a national response. At time of writing, the final policy is not yet in place. Other national frameworks that influence emergency preparedness at the county level include the recently piloted single pipeline guidelines by the Directorate of Special Programmes, which, once finalized, will help regulate the management of food for assets and general food distribution. Furthermore, the EDE Medium-Term Plan II has been integrated into the Baringo CIDP and a county disaster risk reduction plan is outlined in the annex to the CIDP.

As regards county government policy, the CIDP acts as the basis for sectorial annual and quarterly work plans, with each department expected to mainstream emergency preparedness and response into their day-to-day operations.

Baringo County has prepared a disaster management policy. The Deputy Governor's office appointed a team to draft the document, and a draft was submitted in 2014, with the required Cabinet deliberation also having taken place. The policy foresees introducing a holistic approach to disaster risk management spanning prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. The scope of the document includes drought- and non-drought-related disasters, such as health emergencies, consistent with an all-hazards approach. The policy discusses current weaknesses in the existing disaster management system, including the weak policy and legal framework, inadequate finances, issues with data management and information flow, gaps in capacities within communities and institutions, and challenges in coordination and in

linking county and national policies and programmes.

The policy highlights the food sub-sector as the most organized type of emergency response in the county. However, emergency response is, according to the draft document, still very reactive and uncoordinated. The policy foresees a stronger role for the county government to coordinate disaster management, as this work has traditionally been undermined by a lack of a coherent and coordinated policy and institutional framework, resulting in a risk of duplication of efforts and resources. This has also undermined the ability of the system to guarantee a sufficient level of preparedness. The policy notes that this lack of coherent preparedness has led to a heavy emphasis on response. It is important to note that the policy is still in draft form for two reasons: the national policy that it should be anchored on is yet to be passed on; and only limited support was made available for drafting this legislation, and revision may still be required.

Regarding contingency planning, the Baringo Drought Contingency Plan<sup>12</sup> was developed by the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) through a consultative process in 2013 and updated in May 2014. The plan is meant to define the interventions that can be used in each stage of a drought in order to mitigate its impact on the community. The plan highlights linkages to other policy documents, noting that it should not be viewed as a standalone document. The plan utilizes NDMA's contingency planning system, with five phases of drought: normal, alert, alarm, emergency, and recovery, with different types of interventions for the various phases, along with a trigger, timeframe and costing of each. A key feature of this plan

<sup>11</sup> Ministry of Devolution and Planning. 2015. *Draft Devolution Policy*. Nairobi. Government of Kenya.

<sup>12</sup> Baringo County Government. 2014. *Baringo Drought Contingency Plan*.

is that it has an exclusive focus on drought emergencies, which may be problematic in view of the multiple and complex other hazards experienced by the county. This means that for these non-drought hazards, no contingency plans are in place at county level. Key risks include that the revision interval is not determined; and awareness about the plan is feared to be weak. There is therefore reason to make the contingency plan more comprehensive and ensure its effective utilization by all actors in the county.

The county also has a draft disaster risk reduction/climate change resource mobilization and project priority guide 2013–2018, whose development was led by NDMA. The paper envisions a shift from a reactive to a proactive approach to disaster risk reduction based on self-reliance and resilience made possible through community participation, and outlines the tasks this would require of NDMA and the county government, while highlighting the need for community participation in planning of contingency and response strategies. The plan notes the following county priorities:

- strengthening the county policy framework, guidelines and procedures to govern disaster risk management;
- establishing a county disaster information management system to share and consolidate knowledge and evidence for decision-making across organizations;
- developing the county integrated drought and disaster early warning system through modern technology such as geographical information systems to provide accurate information to all actors and trigger response;
- establishing a county disaster contingency fund;

- analysing participatory disaster risk at village level to establish baselines and map stakeholders while identifying opportunities for resilience building;
- producing community contingency and development plans that are sensitive to local hazards;
- empowering the County Disaster Risk Management Committee to strengthen partnerships and mobilize resources.

## Safety Nets

The Kenya National Social Protection Policy (2011), the Constitution of Kenya (Art. 43) and Vision 2030 are three major national policies which guide safety net programming both at the national and county levels. There is a general perception that the national policies are not tailored to county realities.

Within the CIDP there are a number of sections where safety nets are highlighted in varying degrees, in some cases very clearly, as demonstrated in chapter 1 (1.8.7–1.8.9). Furthermore, chapter 2 of the CIDP contains a section on social protection and HIV, which are noted to be major concerns in the county. Chapter 3 discusses various vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, as well as the county's flagship projects, which include asset creation.

The county does not have a specific policy on safety nets. The CIDP, as currently formulated, does not reflect safety nets sufficiently well. A task force has been constituted to review the CIDP and advise on areas requiring updating. Sensitizing the task force on safety net issues may ensure better incorporation of the safety nets into the next CIDP.

When designing its own safety nets, it is important that the county aligns, to some degree, with the features of national safety nets, e.g. with respect to transfer values,

targeting and selection of beneficiaries and registration, to avoid contradictions or inconsistencies. To ensure such alignment, the relevant officials require better information on these features and on the legislative framework for safety nets that guides safety net coordination between the national government and county implementers.

## Hunger Governance Indicator 2: Effective and Accountable Institutions

In this section, the analysis focuses on which formal and informal institutions are active in emergency preparedness and response and safety nets in Baringo County, how effective these are and how the institutions coordinate among themselves based on information from policy documents and the county technical expert panel.

### Emergency Preparedness and Response

A key dimension of effective and accountable institutions is coordination. There was a general agreement by the technical teams that at the moment there is no harmonized approach to disaster management because of the predominantly ad hoc nature of response by various partners. So far NDMA has been the lead institution in charge of early warning and food security assessments and analysis, while the national government (through the County Commissioner's office) and county government lead the actual response, as county structures for coordination are being established. Overall, there is also a prevailing view that assessment information and early warning do not always lead to effective and timely responses in the county.

Baringo County is in the process of establishing a county disaster management unit, which is envisioned to have a dedicated coordinator. The unit already has a budget allocation in the 2015–2016 fiscal year of

the county budget. The formation of this unit is seen as a positive step towards improving coordination and partnerships for emergency preparedness and response.

The County Steering Group (CSG) is the body that currently coordinates both disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness and response. The CSG is currently guided by terms of reference inherited from the defunct District Steering Group. This has partially ensured business continuity, but the terms of reference require revision because of the evolving mandates of the county government and the supporting institutions. The CSG is convened monthly, co-chaired by the County Governor and the County Commissioner. The NDMA acts as the secretariat of the CSG and plays a key role in coordination, as the county government is still forming its relevant institutions.

The CSG is currently not sufficiently well embedded in county legislation. Its ability to ensure that decisions are operationalized depends on the good will of the members. The CSG has also not been audited by an external party. Some self-assessments have been conducted, but these assessments have not been sufficiently well documented and were carried out internally. There is a need to create a regulatory framework for the CSG's existence and mandate. Top CSG leadership has been sensitized on the need for this legislation and on the need to commit funds for the operation of the CSG.

The County Disaster Risk Management Committee is one of the working groups under the CSG. The sub-counties are required to have their sub-county steering group meetings on a quarterly basis to deliberate on issues arising through the CSG. It was noted that at the sub-county level there are no clear coordination structures.



No training has recently been offered to the CSG members on topics such as food security assessment or indicators used in assessments and early warning. This is a problem as CSG members are expected to make decisions based on indicators of which they have a limited understanding. The high staff turnover at the county-level has had an impact on the retention of skills accomplished in past trainings. There is therefore a clear need to build capacity of the CSG members in order to manage transition and create a critical mass that can be relied on for strengthening emergency preparedness and response in the county in the future.

NDMA has also been closely working with the Ministry of Health during the nutrition surveys that are conducted periodically or as a result of a trigger of the early warning system. The NDMA field monitors are routinely involved in these surveys; usually two monitors are involved in the survey each time. So far, eight monitors have been trained on SMART<sup>13</sup> surveys. There is a need to have all the field monitors trained as enumerators, and NDMA officers, together with other Ministry of Health officers, trained as survey supervisors.

NDMA's analysed early warning system data is communicated through monthly bulletins and fed into both the national government's emergency response (coordinated by the Directorate of Special Programmes, Ministry of Devolution and Planning) and the county government's response. For responses to be effective, the interface between NDMA and the county has to function. However, the NDMA-led Drought Contingency Plan has so far not been formally adopted by the county, which is attributed to low county government awareness of the document and its valuable contents.

<sup>13</sup> Standardized monitoring and assessment of relief transition.

Assessment information and early warnings do not always lead to effective and timely responses in the county. Response activities have been delayed due to the slow release of funds and the fact that emergency response systems and procedures are not fully developed. For instance, a shared database for information and knowledge dissemination is not in place, despite it being one of the CIDP flagship projects. Furthermore, food procurement and transport contracting take time, due to a lack of special protocols or standard operating procedures for emergency response. The current early warning system is also used to trigger other detailed surveys, e.g. for nutrition.

Response plans are prepared after receiving sector inputs. While the trigger mechanisms for early warning are acceptable, there is need to draw from lessons learnt and share good practices as well as develop and customize standard operating procedures for response.

For disasters that surpass county capacities, the county relies on the National Disaster Operations Centre.

## Safety Nets

Generally, there is a perception that the capacity of institutions within the county requires strengthening, and there is concern that the CIDP of Baringo County is not fully clear about roles and responsibilities in safety nets.

Furthermore, there seems to be little distinction between the institutions coordinating and implementing safety nets versus emergency response. The structures do not seem to be entirely separate, and the same national and county institutional arrangements apply. The CSG is also the main coordination mechanism for safety nets. There are also technical working groups that can be set up for specific purposes.

The County Assembly is an important stakeholder and there is need to sensitize the members on the role of safety nets in order to create a more solid foundation for the most suitable interventions. A clear understanding will ensure that relevant institutional legislation will be debated and enacted by the legislative body and a further resource allocation commitment ensured.

The social services department of the county government is staffed very thinly (only two staff members). National staff and resources are needed to support the county.

## Hunger Governance

### Indicator 3: Programme Financing and Strategic Planning

This section examines and establishes the county's funding requirements and gauges how existing funding corresponds to the needs at county level.

#### Emergency Preparedness and Response

The total budget requirement for the emergency preparedness and response plan contained in the Baringo CIDP is KES 5.7 billion over the period 2013/14–2017/18. However, currently only 2 percent of the annual county government budget is allocated for emergency response. In 2015, this 2 percent amounted to KES 96 million. In view of constrained funding, a clearer prioritization of needs is deemed important to ensure effective allocation and utilization of the limited resources.

One challenge of the current county government budget allocation towards emergency preparedness and response, according to the county team, is that the funds are insufficient, as they are supposed to cover the needs in all sectors and become exhausted during the year. For fiscal year 2014/15, additional

funding was sought from the Directorate of Special Programmes, as the county budget allocation was exhausted. However, disbursement from the National Treasury is lengthy, leading to delays in resource arrival at the county level. Legislation is currently being put in place to address this.

Key equipment for emergency response is missing, including water trucks, fire extinguishers, flags for early warning and pumps for water harvesting. An additional challenge is that some of the possible programme responses, although well identified, are not costed. This makes it difficult to plan and obtain buy-in from different stakeholders for disaster response.

NDMA receives national funding but this is earmarked for drought response and not any other hazards. Response activities towards drought are, however, built into the budgets of the various sectors, including livestock, water, agriculture, health and nutrition as well as conflict resolution.

Any stakeholder can mobilize resources towards the county's priority areas with approval from the County Disaster Risk Management Committee. Counties are able to mobilize resources from development partners, and all resources mobilized need to be declared to the national government in line with the Public Finance Act.

The drought contingency fund system has triggered a response once in Baringo County, in July 2015. The Drought Contingency Fund needs to have provision for some resources to be disbursed for rapid assessments.

The county government occasionally procures food to be distributed to households that have been affected by various hazards that render them in need of food assistance. The county team, however, mentioned that the amount of food procured could be increased if there were tax waivers for humanitarian supplies at county level. At the moment the National

Treasury is responsible for tax waivers for humanitarian imports, thus the county team proposes dialogue with the relevant national institutions to consider tax waivers for items procured for emergency humanitarian assistance.

## Safety Nets

The county government, in its development plans, has clearly indicated its vision and desire to target youth and women with interventions that will improve their overall well-being. The county government may provide complementary resources for the national cash transfer programmes that are being implemented within the county, as it intends to set up its own cash transfer programme, as indicated in the CIDP. What was unclear or missing is a resource mobilization strategy for safety nets. At the moment, the county has the capacity and ability to mobilize resources such that 50 percent of safety net needs are covered with existing funding. It is recommended that a resource mobilization strategy be developed within county government priorities.

Donor funding for safety net programmes is perceived to be declining at the county level. This could be because a number of projects are ending, and because of changes in donor strategies. Support is perceived to go primarily to the national government, and the county team felt that donors have not yet fully understood the role of the county government.

## Hunger Governance Indicator 4: Programme Design and Management

Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of anti-hunger programme design and management necessitates reviewing the status of planning, content of programmes – including performance – implementing patterns, systems for monitoring and

evaluating programmes and communicating feedback to stakeholders.

### Emergency Preparedness and Response

Both the national and the county government have emergency assistance programmes in place. The coverage of these programmes could potentially be expanded through elimination of duplication.

Programming by the various partners relies on NDMA data. Detailed analysis and sector indicators on drought impact are produced and shared by NDMA. Some sectors of the Government have other surveillance systems in place that are customized to respond to their specific internal requirements. For instance, the Ministry of Health carries out surveillance of diseases and epidemics, the Ministry of Livestock carries out disease surveillance and the Metrological Service gives seasonal forecasts. Traditional forecasters also give information about drought. Civil society partners also have their internal surveillance systems; for instance, Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Netherlands Development Organization) collects market data, World Vision Kenya uses community representatives for information, and the Kenya Red Cross has its own data collection. There are differences in the degree to which these partners share information with other actors. These systems are seen to be complementary to the NDMA system.

However, it was noted that there was no clear point of convergence of the existing early warning system and the other surveillance systems as far as common indicators are concerned. Moreover, the data from partners is not systematically incorporated into the NDMA monthly bulletin. CSG attendance is a key prerequisite for information to be shared or triangulated. It was also noted that the budget that is usually provided for food security assessment is not adequate and the county team always has to approach

partners to enable them to conduct the assessments.

A key limitation in the current NMDA drought early warning system is that it covers only about 40 percent of the county and there is a need to re-locate the current sentinel<sup>14</sup> sites. Of the current sites, 11 are in East Pokot, two in Baringo North and three in Baringo South. The areas not covered include Mogotio, Baringo Central (lowlands), Koibatek, Eldama Ravine, Marigat, Baringo North (some areas), Arabal, Mukutani, and Muchogoi.

The Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project under the Ministry of Livestock has shown interest in supporting additional data collection for a period of five years. However, looking at the time span of the project, there are discussions if the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project can consider supporting the already existing system through sentinel site re-distribution.

On data collection for drought preparedness and early warning, the NDMA field monitors who conduct data collection have been receiving periodic training; however, there is a need to enhance their capacity further, especially on new indicators that are being incorporated in the early warning system, such as the food consumption scores and coping strategy index. Their understanding of the other indicators used to triangulate their data is low, for example, on the remotely sensed and nutrition indicators. Data quality control was also noted to be weak at the sentinel sites, mainly due to insufficient resources to enable officers to undertake thorough quality control checks at the data collection points.

Some of the strengths noted include that the data collection every month is timely and the data reliable. The staff undertaking

the data collection and analysis are well trained and conversant with the analysis for some indicators; though understanding of other indicators remains limited, hence the need for additional capacity strengthening in this area. Additional gaps were agreed to exist in some essential skills relating to geographic information system and database management, report writing, and communication to effectively disseminate the early warning findings.

Early warning information is shared with communities, but mainly in the form of the early warning bulletins produced for the county. These bulletins are rather technical and can therefore barely be understood by communities. There was agreement on the need to develop a simplified version of the bulletin, possibly with illustrations or pictures, for the message to be understood by the community. Colour coding the status of situations would aid community understanding – however, colour printers are not available. A flag system is currently being implemented and is an effective way of communicating the situation and eliciting early action. This should be spread across the whole county. Community meetings (*barazas*) and sub-county CSGs can also be convened to disseminate the information.

Training on the Kenya Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment<sup>15</sup> has been carried out and the tool has been introduced in the county. However, only one person has been trained to analysis level, and there is a need to cascade the training throughout the county. The tool has not yet been tested in the county. Resourcing is a major challenge and different actors are not fully familiar with the tool.

There is a need to have all the NDMA field monitors and other technical staff trained

<sup>14</sup> A sentinel site is a randomly selected location that is visited on a monthly basis for situational monitoring.

<sup>15</sup> KIRA. 2014. *Baringo County Baseline Analysis*. Kenya Inter-Agency Rapid Assessment.

as enumerators and other selected officers trained as survey supervisors. In addition, the county team recommended that teachers at early childhood development centres should also be trained in conducting nutrition assessments. The nutrition working group validates nutrition surveys and this data is inputted in the food security assessments. The nutrition unit is supported by the national nutrition unit with the survey work. Hazard analyses incorporate nutrition in all assessments.

Areas for improvement of analyses include increasing the number of sentinel sites to improve coverage and sample size; linking assessments to more effective community response; sensitizing the community to drought phases using indigenous knowledge and appropriate technology and community gatekeepers (e.g. elders); strengthening capacity for objective and evidence-based reporting of assessment findings (quality assessments can reduce political interference in programme design and management); and capturing dynamic information such as population numbers in early warning systems.

The Directorate of Special Programmes coordinates its food distribution through the County Commissioner, with the sub-county commissioners being in charge of eventual food distribution. At the same time, the county government carries out its own response based on the same information from NDMA. Just as is the case in accessing the county budget allocation for emergency preparedness and response, complex administrative procedures hinder the county government's ability to procure food and other suppliers to respond to emergencies.

Procurement and contracting processes are lengthy and no standard operating procedures for procurement in emergency situations are in place. The Directorate of Special Programmes obtains relief food from the National Cereals and Produce

Board and is not as affected by this challenge. The county government, while theoretically also allowed to purchase from the National Cereals and Produce Board, cannot effectively do so because the payment and delivery terms are not favourable. For instance, the board requires payment in cash up-front, which is not possible for county governments. Additionally, the county government must contract private firms to transport food from the board's warehouse, which is cumbersome.

Targeting of emergency assistance is decided by deputy county commissioners and sub-county administrators relying on 'single pipeline' guidelines that give the food distribution committee the mandate to ensure those requiring food assistance are identified, registered and receive food assistance.

However, there is no clear mechanism of ensuring that the food reaches the intended beneficiaries. There was mention of some cases of diversion of food for emergency assistance, which have highlighted the need for better monitoring and accountability mechanisms.

Furthermore, there is a risk of duplication of benefits or 'double dipping', driven by the lack of a harmonized database on beneficiaries under different response programmes. Individual programmes rely mostly on stand-alone Excel sheets for beneficiary data management. Some civil society organizations use biometric identification in the county, but the county government has not yet replicated such technologies. The county team recognizes beneficiary information management as a gap and has put in place a standing committee to consolidate the databases for emergency assistance in the county as provided for in the CIDP.

Programme execution is also hindered by difficult transport conditions, as a

number of locations are not accessible to heavy transport, as well as by inadequate warehouse and storage management skills. There are no guidelines for storage and warehousing of special nutritious products.

Programmes are rigid and not able to adapt to changing needs and do not always incorporate lessons learnt. This is in part due to the fact that lessons are not documented. An area for development of processes is quality inspection of food commodities prior to distribution. Strengthened county government guidelines should be put in place to regulate the quality assurance processes at various stages of the response supply chain. Purchases in the past have been based on good will and the assumption that the suppliers will deliver good-quality products. Assistance from the Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service and other agencies should be engaged to ensure maximum safety of products and commodities procured for emergency response.

## Safety Nets

Baringo benefits from many national safety net programmes, and the county government has sought to complement these or design county-led safety nets. The long-term safety nets currently in place in Baringo are:

- Older Persons Cash Transfer. This is a national programme that aims to support the livelihoods of and alleviate the poverty of old people. According to the CIDP, the programme reaches 5,036 beneficiary households. The CIDP notes that the county desires to complement the national funding to expand the programme coverage or establish a county programme.
- People with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer. This national safety net is for disabled persons, with 539 beneficiary households targeted in Baringo at the time of writing. The CIDP notes the county government may consider establishing a similar programme. The National Fund for the Disabled also provides disabled persons with assistive devices and grants.
- Cash Transfer to Orphans and Vulnerable Children. This national programme supports orphans and promotes their schooling and healthcare. In Baringo, the programme reaches 5,337 beneficiary households.
- WFP school feeding. This programme benefits 27,000 pupils in East Baringo (early childhood development centre feeding is being devolved to county governments, starting in January 2016).
- The Government's Home Grown School Meals Programme. This benefits 65,000 pupils in the sub-counties other than Baringo.
- Supplementary feeding provided by WFP. This supports around 3,000 moderately malnourished pregnant and lactating women as well as children under the age of five.
- WFP's Food for Assets programme. This benefits 10,400 persons in East Pokot and a further 16,200 in Marigat. The objective of this productive safety net programme is to reduce climate-induced risks and enable communities to meet their food needs and be resilient to shocks in the long term.
- Food vouchers from Action Aid. These are provided to 400 households in East Pokot.
- The National Health Insurance Fund. This covers 400 people.
- The distribution of agricultural inputs.

- A women and youth group loans programme. This is financed by the county and benefits 90 groups.

The county has sought to complement national safety nets, as their coverage is perceived to be inadequate. As regards the cash transfers for the elderly and disabled, the county seeks to launch a complementary initiative. The county had budgeted KES 10 million for this initiative in the current financial year, but no transfers have yet been made. The County Assembly has drafted the regulations for the programme, including for targeting, disbursement, and administration of the fund, but these have to be first aligned with national regulations before the programme can be operationalized.

The county is interested in expanding the asset creation programme presently supported by WFP.

While the national safety net programmes and the safety nets run by partners have clear and formalized targeting criteria and targeting and beneficiary registration procedures, the targeting of county-led initiatives is less consolidated. For instance, for the loans to women's and youth groups, credit committees define which groups should be targeted without clearly documented criteria.

The county team noted that not all the persons or households in need are currently reached through the existing safety nets. However, there are no targets for safety net coverage at the county level, and the county team notes that availability of funding defines what can be done. Evidence about the gap that should be filled could be further consolidated.

Data about the coverage of the different programmes is dispersed. Coordination of safety nets could be improved through the application of the Single Registry for safety nets. This is currently managed at

the national level, with plans to have it decentralized. The decentralization process of the Single Registry should take into account the interventions being proposed by the counties to ensure harmonization of targeting across national and county-led safety nets.

## Hunger Governance

### Indicator 5: Continuity and Sustained National Capacity/Civil Society Voice

The county has a long-term vision for sustaining emergency preparedness and response activities. This vision is translated into action in departmental operational plans.

The EDE at the national level is cascaded to the county level by the presence of a vibrant county drought management office, which is actively engaged in a number of early warning and preparedness activities. This in effect gives sustainability to the whole drought management agenda, resource availability being the most significant impediment. Drought is possibly the most persistent of the hazards to which Baringo County has been perennially exposed. The concerted efforts towards drought management are therefore expected to be sustainable in the future, albeit at the expense of the management of other hazards.

In terms of tangible activities currently being undertaken in the county, the leadership is investing in and expanding irrigation agriculture. The intention is to have 300,000 ha of land under irrigation over the next five years. This is expected to address food insecurity in the county in the long run. In addition, the Department of Agriculture is currently engaged in developing drought-resistant varieties of various crops for distribution to the irrigation schemes.




## **BARINGO COUNTY**

**Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment**  
for Food Security Safety Nets and Emergency  
Preparedness and Response

The consultations of the technical committee revealed a continuing engagement of the Government with various partners on emergency response activities and safety net programmes, mostly through the CSG. Most civil society interventions were noted to be project based and heavily dependent on donor funding. Aligning current programmes with the county government's priorities would ensure that such programmes are integrated and qualify for county funding, which will cushion the projects from unpredictable and diminishing donor funding.

The development of an integrated information system with feedback mechanisms for interventions and programmes implemented by the county would go a long way to ensuring sustainability of emergency preparedness and response best practices and learning from previous interventions. In addition, the systematic documentation would facilitate the development of an evidence-based resource mobilization strategy that diversifies resourcing.





## 4

## PROPOSALS FOR CAPACITY SUPPORT

The above analysis points to the following areas in which capacity support should be prioritized:

- coordination and county government leadership, including transparency and accountability;
- general programme design and preparation;
- early warning and food security assessment;
- programme implementation, including humanitarian supply chain management;
- information management, advocacy and resource mobilization.

The following sections list potential capacity support activities for each of these areas.

### Coordination and County Government Leadership

1. Assist with formulation of a regulatory framework (including guidelines and terms of reference) that will clarify the membership and roles of the CSG as a coordination body.
2. Support the establishment and regular work of sub-county steering groups (terms of reference, preparation and follow-up).
3. Support the establishment of the county disaster management unit to act as a focal point for all emergency preparedness and response activities, including training and technical skills for department management and coordination of actors, e.g. with respect to the prioritization of needs to ensure effective utilization of limited resources.
4. Strengthen the weak coordination mechanisms by establishing a policy framework within which the CSG operates.

5. Support the review and update of the contingency plan to take into account multiple and complex hazards experienced by the county.
6. Develop protocols or standard operating procedures for emergency response that will provide guidance on food procurement and transport contracting.
7. Support the adaptation of single pipeline guidelines prepared by the Directorate for Special Programmes.

### General Programme Design and Preparation

1. Sensitize the CIDP review task force on safety net issues.
2. Provide training on the regulatory framework and national standards or guidelines for normal-time and emergency safety nets.
3. Provide training on and support the establishment of county-level guidelines and standards for food-for-assets or cash-for-assets programmes or for general food and cash relief programmes.
4. Assist with determining and identifying intended beneficiaries through numerous selection processes, including geographic targeting, and assist in identifying the relevant actors involved.
5. Assist with registration of beneficiaries and establishing a management information system that allows communication between different county programmes and between county and national programmes.

### Early Warning and Food Security Assessment

1. Provide training on and develop technical skills around data collection to improve the quality of data collected

in food security and vulnerability assessments.

2. Strengthen emergency preparedness strategies and advocate budgetary allocations for preparedness and mitigation activities.
3. Train all early warning field monitors as enumerators for nutrition surveys and key technical officers with other Ministry of Health officers as survey supervisors.
4. Put in place a shared database for information and knowledge dissemination.
5. Train county technical officers on tools and methodologies used for early warning analysis including basic GIS and remote sensing.

#### **Programme Implementation, including Humanitarian Supply Chain Management**

1. Support a logistics capacity assessment exercise to establish the availability of various logistics services in the county.
2. Support the development of standard operating procedures to guide food assistance planning and distribution.
3. Support the establishment of stand-by contracts and pre-qualification of contractors.
4. Develop a quality assurance strategy for the relief commodities to ensure that commodities handled at various points of the supply chain are safe and fit for human consumption at the point of distribution.
5. Support the training of key staff on commodity management and accounting, including development of guidelines for storage and warehousing of special nutritious products.
6. Support the training of NDMA and county government staff on food security and vulnerability assessments,

data collection, Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tools, etc.

7. Procure key equipment for emergency response e.g. water trucks, pumps for water harvesting, flags for early warning.
8. Support the identification of an efficient and accountable flow of funds for any cash-based programmes, including payment mechanisms.
9. Support the establishment of monitoring and evaluation for safety nets and emergency response, which could be linked to the EDE monitoring and evaluation framework that is being launched in early November 2015 and rolled out to the county.

#### **Information Management, Advocacy and Resource Mobilization**

1. Support the establishment of a county disaster contingency fund with clear criteria and processes for disbursements, including the release of funds for rapid assessments.
2. Develop a resource mobilization strategy for safety nets that is clear on how the county would finance its cash transfer programme, which could also be used to sensitize donors on the importance of funding the county programmes.
3. Support the development of a knowledge management system to make information available in a timely manner to decision-makers and also act as a repository for lessons learnt from previous emergency response actions.
4. Support advocacy on emergency preparedness and mitigation activities to receive budgetary provision for implementation.
5. Support simplified communication with communities so they can actually benefit from early warning information.

## 5

## METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF BASELINE CAPACITY INDICATOR SCORES

WFP is increasingly engaging in supporting national capacities in food and nutrition security. Consequently, the organization has developed a methodology for identifying a national capacity indicator that can measure the potential outcomes of its work. WFP at the corporate level had already provided a framework for this, which WFP Kenya has adapted and completed to fit (a) with the specific situation concerning safety nets and (b) the ongoing process of devolution.

A national capacity indicator is, in principle, calculated by averaging capacity scores in three areas (social safety nets, productive safety nets, and disaster management). For Kenya, these areas were re-drawn to encompass safety nets (both social and productive ones) and emergency preparedness and response.

Within each area, capacities are analysed with respect to five areas of hunger governance:

- policy and legislative environment
- effective and accountable institutions
- financing and strategic planning
- programme design and management
- continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice

For each of these hunger governance areas, a hunger governance indicator is established by averaging scores for the following five core capacity characteristics:

- the level of commitment and political will;
- the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery of programmes and services;
- the ability to mobilize resources and partnerships to make these programmes possible;

- the sustainability and stability of institutions and programmes;
- the ability to innovate and improve to ensure that programmes can adapt to changing needs and conditions.

The county teams identified whether for a given core capacity characteristic the level of capacity is latent (score 1), emergent (score 2), moderate (score 3) or self-sufficient (score 4).

WFP had prepared the capacity gaps and needs assessment process by formulating a long list of specific questions that guided the discussion of each core capacity characteristic under each hunger governance area for both safety nets and emergency preparedness and response. For the latter, two separate question guides were prepared, one for early warning and food security assessments, and one for humanitarian supply chain management.

The county teams discussed the questions and established scores for each core capacity characteristic. All scores have the same weight. Where several questions had been formulated for the same core capacity characteristic, their scores were averaged. An aggregate score for each hunger governance indicator was then calculated by averaging the five core capacity characteristic scores.

The hunger governance indicator scores for early warning and food security assessment and for humanitarian supply chain management were averaged into one hunger governance indicator for emergency preparedness and response. Finally, the hunger governance indicators for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response were averaged into one composite county capacity indicator. This is illustrated in Table 1.

**Table 1** Methodology for calculating hunger governance indicator scores

	HUNGER GOVERNANCE AREA	1: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT	2: EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS	3: PROGRAMME FINANCING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING	4: PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT	5: CONTINUITY AND SUSTAINED NATIONAL CAPACITY/CIVIL SOCIETY VOICE
<b>Row</b>	<b>SAFETY NETS</b>					
1	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
2	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
3	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
4	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
5	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
6	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 1–5)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
7	Overall baseline for safety nets	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 6 values)				
<b>EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT</b>						
8	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
9	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
10	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
11	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
12	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
13	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 8–12)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
14	Overall baseline for early warning and food security	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 13 values)				
<b>HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT</b>						
15	CCC 1	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
16	CCC 2	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
17	CCC 3	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
18	CCC 4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
19	CCC 5	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4	Score of 1–4
20	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 15–19)	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores	Mean of CCC 1 to CCC 5 scores
21	Overall baseline for humanitarian supply chain management	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 20 values)				
<b>EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE (COMBINED EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT+HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT)</b>						
22	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 13 and 20)	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment	Mean of humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment
23	Overall baseline for emergency preparedness and response	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 22 values)				
<b>COMBINED SAFETY NETS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE</b>						
24	Hunger governance indicator (mean of rows 6 and 22)	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets	Mean of emergency preparedness and response and safety nets
	County capacity indicator	Mean of hunger governance indicators (mean of row 24 values)				

**Note:** CCC – core capacity characteristic

The composite county capacity indicator will form the baseline against which any outcomes of the planned capacity support programmes between the county and WFP will be measured. Specific assessments of progress can be based on the detailed scores for core capacity characteristics and hunger governance indicators included in the completed question guides in annexes 1–3.

## Results of the Capacity Gap Needs Assessment Process

The scores for each core capacity characteristic under each hunger governance indicator for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response are provided in Table 2 and are shown in more detail in annexes 1–3. The hunger governance indicator scores for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response (disaggregated by humanitarian supply chain management and early warning and food security assessment) are summarized here:

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 1 (policy and legislative environment)** is

- **2.5** for safety nets and
- **2.7** for emergency preparedness and response (2.8 for humanitarian supply chain management and 2.5 for early warning and food security assessment).

A higher score could be achieved if i) the disaster policy was enacted, which would provide a framework for coherence and coordination and minimize the risk of duplication of efforts and resources; ii) the county had an overall policy on safety nets, including how its own resources should be used to complement national or other partners' programmes; iii) safety nets were integrated into the CIDP; and

iv) existing national regulations, guidelines and standards were better known and incorporated or adapted to the county.

The score for **hunger governance indicator 2 (effective and accountable institutions)** is

- **2.7** for safety nets and
- **2.6** for emergency preparedness and response (2.4 for humanitarian supply chain management and 2.7 for early warning and food security assessment).

A higher score could be achieved if i) a county disaster management unit would function as the focal point for all systems, structures and processes necessary for an efficient emergency response, and if it had sufficient staff with adequate qualifications and tools to ensure effective coordination and use of limited resources for safety nets and emergency preparedness and response; ii) there was a county-level regulatory framework for the CSG, including a formalized description of its mandate and tasks and the roles and responsibilities of its member; and iii) if corresponding sub-county steering groups were functioning on a regular basis and provided useful coordination.

The baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 3 (programme financing and strategic planning)** is

- **2.6** for safety nets and
- **2.5** for emergency preparedness and response (2.4 for humanitarian supply chain management and 2.5 for early warning and food security assessment).

These scores could be higher if i) there was a county disaster contingency fund with clear objectives and criteria and processes for disbursement; ii) there were county resources prioritized for safety nets; iii) the county had a clear and realistic resource mobilization strategy; and iv) the county

was able to establish and manage a county-level single pipeline.

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 4 (programme design and management)** is

- **3.0** for safety nets and
- **2.5** for emergency preparedness and response (2.2 for humanitarian supply chain management and 2.8 for early warning and food security assessment).

A higher score could be achieved if the county had i) a clear description for its safety net and emergency response programmes that documents the criteria and processes used to decide on the best response modality (e.g. food or cash, and unconditional versus asset creation work), eligibility criteria, selection processes, registration, distribution and payment mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation; and ii) a mechanism through which complaints and grievances can be managed, resolved and reported on.

If the county decided to support an asset creation programme, a higher score for this indicator would also require that the county ensured a transparent and participatory way of identifying assets to

be created, integrating them into CIDPs, and securing adequate technical guidance.

The aggregate baseline capacity score for **hunger governance indicator 5 (continuity and sustained national capacity/civil society voice)** is

- **3.2** for safety nets (this score was deemed high during the validation session, and during an internal review, the county team suggested reviewing it), and
- **2.7** for emergency preparedness and response (2.5 for humanitarian supply chain management and 2.8 for early warning and food security assessment).

A higher score could be achieved if the county had an integrated system for information dissemination and knowledge management, which could be used for advocacy and integrating ongoing programmes with the EDE. The system could draw on resources that not only address droughts but also hazards, and could include a feedback mechanism to ensure a structured approach to learning and integrating lessons and best practices into subsequent operations and programmes.

**Table 2** Hunger governance indicator and county capacity scores – Baringo

HUNGER GOVERNANCE AREA	1: POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT	2: EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE INSTITUTIONS	3: PROGRAMME FINANCING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING	4: PROGRAMME DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT	5: CONTINUITY AND SUSTAINED NATIONAL CAPACITY/CIVIL SOCIETY VOICE
<b>SAFETY NETS</b>					
CCC 1	3.0	3.1	2.5	3.5	-
CCC 2	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.1	-
CCC 3	2.3	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.0
CCC 4	2.8	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.5
CCC 5	2.0	2.2	2.0	-	3.0
<b>Hunger governance indicator</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Overall baseline for safety nets</b>	<b>2.8</b>				
<b>EARLY WARNING AND FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT</b>					
CCC 1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.9	3.0
CCC 2	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.5
CCC 3	-	3.0	2.0	2.8	2.7
CCC 4	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
CCC 5	2.5	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.6
<b>Hunger governance indicator</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.8</b>
<b>Overall baseline for early warning and food security</b>	<b>2.7</b>				
<b>HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT</b>					
CCC 1	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.5
CCC 2	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.1
CCC 3	3.5	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5
CCC 4	2.9	2.7	2.0	1.5	2.3
CCC 5	2.5	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.2
<b>Hunger governance indicator</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>Overall baseline for humanitarian supply chain management</b>	<b>2.5</b>				
<b>EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE</b>					
<b>Hunger governance indicator</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>
<b>Overall baseline for emergency preparedness and response</b>	<b>2.6</b>				
<b>COMBINED SAFETY NETS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE</b>					
<b>Hunger governance indicator</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.9</b>
<b>County capacity indicator</b>	<b>2.7</b>				

**Note:** CCC – core capacity characteristic

# ANNEX 1: BARINGO CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: SAFETY NETS

## Social and Productive Safety Nets including Emergency Assistance Planning, Resilience, and Recovery

### HGI 1: Policy and Legislative Environment

Overall priorities: Policies are generally in formulation stage. Development of these policies requires technical expertise. Updating the contingency plan is a priority.

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	<b>Is the importance of safety nets (social/productive), including in emergency assistance planning, resilience and recovery adequately reflected in national/county development plans, policies, strategies, laws, etc.? (CCC1)</b>	SN are adequately reflected.	<b>3.0</b>
1.a	List relevant instruments from the constitution to national and county development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable. In particular, is there a national/county level multi-sectorial SN policy that addresses the needs of the affected communities? Do relevant instruments specify the roles, objectives and expected results for the different sectors?	Main documents are CIDP, sector plans, drought contingency plan, disaster preparedness plans, and five year plans for sectors, as well as the specific regulations and guidelines for programmes.  Stated in chapter 6 of the CIDP. At level 2 (function at basic and variable level). Formulated in 2013 as the county governments were coming into place.  High priority to sensitize the task force that will update the CIDP on the issue of safety nets.  There is no SN policy at the county level.	
1.b	Are these instruments up to date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to the devolved government structure? Do they take into account different kinds of assistance, including emergency assistance planning as well as recovery and resilience building?	The CIDP should be updated to suit the rapidly changing community needs. No update is yet organized or scheduled. Other counties are reviewing their plans, but Baringo not yet. In reviewing the document, SN issues should be looked at more in detail.  Acknowledges planning will be done in collaboration with other partners. Sector plans up to date and articulated. Five year plans for sectors being made now.  Single pipeline guideline is in draft stage.  County disaster policy are in draft stage. Deputy Governor's office has appointed a team or contracted a team to do the policy. The cabinet has deliberated on the policy.	
1.c	Which are the roles foreseen for national/county level actors based on above listed development plans, policies, strategies, laws?	At the higher level in the CIDP, individual sector plans spell out details on roles of various personnel.	
1.d	Does the county have its own instruments related to safety nets? CIDP, specific policies, plans or programmes? Do these include emergency assistance planning, recovery and resilience building?		
1.e	In particular, does government (at national and sub-national level) prepare contingency plans in adequate intervals that foresee the provision of emergency assistance? If yes, how? If no, what are the challenges?	NDMA together with the county government and stakeholders developed a drought contingency plan. Some other disasters are out. This means there is no contingency plan for conflicts, fires, floods, landslides, disease outbreaks. There is a need to draft a wider contingency plan that includes these risks. There is no agreed revision date or frequency. NDMA national office should allocate funds for this. This is a county instrument as it has been approved by the CSG.  Not practical due to resource constraints. Ideally 10 percent of the budget should be set aside for contingency.	
1.f	Do relevant instruments include clear objectives and targets related to relevant SN indicators?	Yes. Targets and objectives are clear.	
2.	<b>Does the national/county government have a policy/strategy of mobilizing and using relief resources (food or cash) complemented with development resources (human, financial, and/or other resources) to build resilience against droughts? (CCC1)</b>	No county level policy but this is a priority going forward. Food during drought through the Office of the Deputy Governor in conjunction with partners like Red Cross. Like maize, beans, rice and oil. Level 3 since they do this with support. CSG has single pipeline guidelines.	
3.	Do relevant instruments effectively identify and address the needs of the affected population both in emergency and non-emergency situations? (CCC2)	Yes. They respond. E.g. those in Marigat whose houses were burnt were given food and blankets. Rapid Results Initiative for Agriculture, farms were cultivated for the displaced and given seeds and fertilizer and hives in Mukutani, Mochongoi, Kiserian.	<b>3.0</b>





3.a	For SSN and PSN, how are affected populations being defined? For SSN, is the definition of vulnerability the selection criteria? How is vulnerability being defined, i.e. which groups does it imply (orphans, disabled, elderly, etc.) and which criteria are being used to describe various degrees of vulnerability (vulnerable, most vulnerable, etc.)? Which type of vulnerabilities are being considered (food security and malnutrition, which others)? For PSN, which selection criteria are effective?	Populations affected not defined. We prioritize women and children-review from social services department	
3.b	Are there gaps in the existing instruments? Are there important groups, or important needs, that are not addressed by the identified instruments? Which?	<p>Gaps exist. CIDP does not state clearly the roles.</p> <p>There is awareness of the target groups. Institutions exist but we not sure of what guides the information and criteria. Upon follow up we can confirm the capacity level....</p> <p>The policies are there and the institutions....</p> <p>Need to raise awareness of the policies among stakeholders. Shared development of policies and people do not know how the policies are developed. There is need to disseminate the information to community members to be able to act.</p>	<b>2.0</b>
3.c	Are legislative changes necessary to support the implementation of policies and strategies addressing needs of affected groups (e.g. policies for procurement of goods and services; legislation on food fortification, import restrictions on certain foods and other commodities, legal barriers to access to medical services for specific groups)?	<p>Legislative changes are necessary, however, there to read through the documents and evaluation.</p> <p>There was a county meeting to evaluate and check which laws, regulations and policies that need changes. Each sector was asked to list the legislation they would want to be changed.</p> <p>Institutions are there policies there only functions not clear. There are areas that need to be enforced. there are bills like public health provided by the national government and need to be adopted by the county assembly. Domesticated the national bills and policies to fit county setting.</p> <p>Advocate to build capacity of MCAs to raise awareness. So that they can make sound decisions during assembly debates.</p> <p>Implementation and enforcement of the bill. The county government does not have prosecutors. No reinforcement capacity.</p> <p>E.g. domestication of national NACADA laws into the county</p> <p>There are bills and acts. The Acts are laws already passed by parliament while the bills have not been passed, they contain existing laws.</p> <p>Instruments borrowed from national government are yet to be adopted in the county. Support needed.</p> <p>There are gaps that need support</p>	<b>1.8</b>
3.d	Are intentions and policies supported by adequate legislation and regulations, and translated into action plans with clear responsibilities, results frameworks and timelines?	<p>Not adequate. Gap in legislation. County has embarked on addressing the gaps.</p> <p>Action plan will be developed from deliberations.</p>	
3.e	Are the relevant instruments being implemented? State for each identified instrument?	<p>CIDP</p> <p>Based on implementation various sector have their own strategic plan. However, CIDP is referred to make plans.</p> <p>Each sector has a 5-year strategic plan.</p> <p>What was being used before? It was haphazard, implementation being done on an ad hoc basis.</p> <p>Does this limit the delivery? There are rules given early in the year to look at gaps in the CIDP. E.g. health identified gaps. These will be taken to the assembly to be addressed.</p> <p>Priorities have changed and there is need to review the existing plans and advocate for political buy in</p> <p>There has been citizen participation in developing the development plans. However, they do not participate in the reviewing of these plans. There is no provision of involving the citizens and that may affect the quality of the documents.</p> <p>Public participation not adequate.... need for sensitization and civic education. This could be coz lack of resources or lack of citizens' technical capacity, cultural practices.</p> <p>Gap in the strategic plan and transition to the annual work-plan. e.g. issues of allocation of resources CIDP as 10m project for the project to be implemented it should be in the actual work plan.... it gets missed due to lack of resources. CIDP is at a higher priority, whilst sector priorities may be different. Inherent risk due to political interference*, inadequate resources and imbalanced resource allocations.</p> <p>Gap... politicized county development plans affect the sector implementation.</p> <p>There are partner/stakeholder forums who share the work plans to assist in developing the CIDP.</p> <p>Capacity support: Sensitization of stakeholders and political leaders. External resource mobilization, advocacy.</p>	<b>2.5</b>

4.	<b>When devising safety net instruments, both in emergency and non-emergency situations, has the government established partnerships with relevant key stakeholders (UN, civil society, private sector, research institutes, other governments, etc.), specifically with those players that have a direct role in promoting safety nets? (CCC3)</b>	Yes, NDMA, NGOs (Acted, World Vision Kenya, KRC, AA). JICA - Agreement to sink boreholes WFP - FFA Activities Banks sometimes contribute to dev. activities. MOUS signed with UNICEF, WHO for provision of ambulance, AMREF, With Queen of England (trachoma campaign) World Vision Kenya, Beyond Zero campaign, Walter reed, During CSGs many players participate in discussing development issues. Gaps - The programmes are curative but not preventive measures. e.g. issues of sanitation. There is need to attract more partners to address the preventive measures or develop preventive activities.	<b>3.1</b>
4.a	Which sectors and non-state partners are reflected in the relevant policies and strategies addressing needs of SN affected groups?	All sectors involved. Non state actor also mentioned. As above and refer to exiting action plans. The communities embrace nice hospitals, ambulance etc. They need to be sensitized on the importance of preventive measures like vaccinations, proper healthy practices to prevent diseases. Most partners are listed in the action plans.	<b>3.5</b>
4.b	Which are the key players in safety net related partnerships of national and county government? Are their current efforts to enhance partnerships? If so, which strategies are being pursued? If not, which are challenges that the government might face in doing so?	Safety net programmes are assistance provided to vulnerable groups over a prolonged period due to inability to fend for food, education. e.g. orphans and vulnerable groups catered for education, older persons provided with monthly remittances. CEC is the entry point of the health sector. They are the ones who look for partners. Is there a partnership strategy? CIDP addresses that the various partners have a key role to play. Within performance contracting/monitoring there is an element of stakeholders' expectations. Efforts are there to enhance partnerships but they are not coordinated. They are haphazard. Wing run by CEC to reach the international community. Gap: Institutional partnership building needs to be strengthened. Currently is more of an individual effort/personal skill. Institutional partnership strategy will assist in a more guided approach. No existing framework for partnership building and engagement.	<b>1.2</b>
4.c	Do the relevant documents include mechanisms for partner coordination/policy dialogue? If not, is there a need?	No document. There is need of clear structures and guidelines. The CSG is responsible for coordination of stakeholders and uses the CSG guidelines. (guidelines borrowed from former Arid Lands) Other counties like Mandera have enacted the CSG to recognize them as a legal entity. There is a need to legalize the CSG however, there are perceived challenges. The current decision is not legally binding and there is not accountability. Most decisions and actions are minuted and on a gentleman's agreement. Overreliance on good will. There is a need to institutionalize and legalize partnership coordinator strategies and also engage external partners	<b>1.5</b>
5.	<b>Do national and county development plans/policies, and other safety net related instruments link to other relevant instruments and programmes? If any, which are differences that occur in emergency vs. non-emergency states? (Coordination mechanisms) (CCC4)</b>	With the existing CSG there is linkages by borrowing from CIDP to develop sector plans. E.g. on issues of emergency. There is need for a streamlined method of operations in emergency. Through the relief and distribution committee there are efforts to streamline through the single pipeline	<b>2.3</b>
5.a	Is there coherence between the national/county SN policy and action plan and sector plans in relation to addressing needs of the affected populations?	Health sector is divided into 5 key blocks; HR, service delivery, finance, drugs & vaccines and policy. The national government used to implement all these programmes. All sections remained at the top apart from policy formulation. The strategic plans are a replication of the national plan. There is a coherence and a lot is borrowed from CIDP and national plans. When it comes to needs of affected populations, the community have parallel plans. CIDP reflects what the community wants but sometimes during implementation the community wants something different so action plans have to be adjusted. Gaps: limited resources (both financial and time). How do we change the CIDP to reflect community changing needs? How often is the CIDP be reviewed?	<b>3.0</b>
5.b	Are county level plans and strategies aligned with national SN and relevant sector policies?	Yes. Sector plans are always developed in alignment with national plans. The national strategies are customized to county needs. Sector plans borrow from the CIDP.	<b>3.0</b>

5.c	Are there mechanisms in place to encourage trial of innovative approaches for addressing the needs of the affected population?	For climate change mitigation, subsidies, irrigation and inputs are provided. County gives loans for vulnerable groups – women and youth – for community projects. Capacity building given to vulnerable groups. Upgrading of livestock. Resources are lacking for innovative initiatives.	<b>2.5</b>
5.d	Do safety net related instruments take cognizance of the differences in geographic areas, gender, age, and the distribution of hunger and food and nutrition insecurity?	Yes. A resource mapping is done to target areas in need. The old are targeted, and youth and women are prioritized for support. We map conflict areas so that we can address hotspots with support. At the national level, there is a baseline survey (Short/Long Rains Assessment) on food security that identifies affected areas. GAM survey done but in only sub-county, in 2014 in East Pokot, due to funding constraints. Need to improve on geographical targeting and ensure funding.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>Are the relevant national and sub-national instruments in support of safety nets responsiveness to changing situations and needs with respect to emergencies, resilience building and recovery measures? (CCC5)</b>	Yes. CIDP allows for reallocation of resources in emergencies. Work on going on disaster policy (in draft stage).	
6.a	How has the emergency assistance provided in recent years been adjusted to varying levels of needs?	NMDA has a drought contingency plan. During implementation the activities have had to be adjusted based on community needs. Contingency plans are developed in consultation. There are early warning systems (NDMA, meteorological department) that can feed into plans.	
6.b	Have emergency assistance plans in recent years been timely to ensure adequate response?	There was a cholera outbreak and there was no response due to the county not supporting with mobilizing staff, isolating areas. Funds have been budgeted for emergencies but accessing them is time consuming. There have been delays in drought response and response to security-related response. Procurement processes delay the response. There should be special, lighter procedures for emergencies. Contingency planning needs more resources. There is a lack of common understanding of what is considered an emergency.	<b>1.0</b>
6.c	Is there a system for policy review and updates in place that uses current SN analyses and includes engagement and endorsement by all sectors/main stakeholders?	Sector programmes are reviewed periodically. As the policy is not yet in place, there are no reviews. The CIDP can be updated. Sectors are consulted for CIDP updates.	<b>2.0</b>
6.d	Are relevant SN policies and strategies updated regularly in line with changing conditions, needs and global evidence?	Yes. NDMA reviews its contingency and disaster preparedness plans to fit county conditions, through a consultative process (preparedness plans cover all hazards in the county). The current contingency plan is from two years ago. The revision interval has not been determined. Resources constrain the revision of plans. Sectoral annual and quarterly plans can be adjusted.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 1:</b>			<b>2.5</b>

## HGI 2: Effective and Accountable Institutions

Sensitize and build capacity of Deputy Governor's office to coordinate safety nets and emergency response. Ensure that information about programme needs reach the Deputy Governor's office so that they can lobby for budget allocations.

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	Is there a designated lead institution within the national and/or county government with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the function of planning and management of safety nets, both with respect to emergency assistance and resilience? (CCC1)	Yes. Office of the Deputy Governor is in charge of disaster management, emergency assistance. There is a plan to employ an officer in charge of disaster management in the Deputy Governor's office.	3.5
1.a	Which institution? If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or contradict each other? What does the coordination between ministries look like at the national/county level?	Office of the Deputy Governor is in charge. The County Commissioner plays a role in representing the national government in these matters, and this office handles general food distribution. All coordination through CSG that meets monthly. The national government is member of CSG, along with other development partners. Resources constrain regular CSG meetings. In the Deputy Governor's office there is a disaster committee.	3.0
1.b	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that all affected people are adequately covered by emergency assistance? Are there gaps between institutional mandates? Which?	The structures are in place. Funding constraints in the institutions and the adequacy of assistance. There are gaps in the supply chain or logistics. For instance, inadequate fire engines, lorries, warehouses. Insecurity, poor roads, poor network makes it difficult to access some areas.	2.0
1.c	Who is in charge, responsible and accountable for which tasks?	Deputy Governor office is accountable and in charge. The Directorate of Special Programmes and County Commissioner. Administration – Deputy Governor/CC Finance – Deputy Governor/CC Resource mobilization – Deputy Governor/CC Coordination – Deputy Governor/CC Legal framework for the coordination between Deputy Governor and CC does not exist. CSG is an ad hoc arrangement.	3.0
1.d	Who bears overall responsibility for the institution's performance?	County government - Governor and national government – County Commissioner	4.0
1.e	How is leadership chosen and defined?	The Commissioner is appointed by the President. County Governor is elected and appoints the Deputy Governor. The roles are guided by the Constitution.	
1.f	What is the reporting structure?	Devolved functions report to county – sectors are health, environment, culture, water, lands, agriculture etc. – report to the Governor. Security, education (primary and above) are national functions and report to the Commissioner. Disaster management is both devolved and national.	4.0
1.g	Does the institution (or any of the institutions) have a specific food security and nutrition mandate/focus? If so, which?	Both national and county level. Ministry of Agriculture and Health mandated to deal with food security and nutrition. National government supports with coordination and general food distribution. Some grey areas remain. Resource constraints.	2.0
1.h	Has there been a historical evolution of the mandate? If so, how and why?	County governments developing their policy framework.	
2.	Has there been significant changes in size, growth, programmes, leadership and structure of the lead institution, in particular due to poverty, emergency situations, resilience building or recovery? (CCC2)	There is expansion because of the creation of the Deputy Governor's office. New leadership has been brought in. County and national programmes run concurrently and therefore there has been an expansion of programmes.	2.5
3.	Are the roles/responsibilities of the different stakeholders and administrative levels clearly defined for the relevant functions between the county/national level and within the county? (CCC2)	Not stipulated in the CIDP, but each department is aware of their roles. There is a gap in the definition of roles.	3.0
4.	Are all relevant safety net stakeholders aware of their roles and responsibilities with respect to safety nets both at the county/national level and within the county? (CCC2)	The awareness exists, but resources are constrained.	3.0

5.	Do relevant institutions have systems, processes and resources (e.g. in terms of staff, knowledge, guidelines/procedures and equipment) to be efficient and accountable in both emergency and non-emergency situations? Provide answers for each relevant institution; e.g. is there sufficient staff, and does relevant staff have sufficient knowledge and skills to ensure adequate and timely safety net benefits? (CCC2)	Disaster response and preparedness, early warning systems knowledge needs strengthening – agriculture, water and irrigation, livestock, health and WASH, lands, environment, social services, administration, security (national).  Equipment (and training in use) lacking: e.g. fire extinguishers, water trucks, rain gauge for early warning, flags for early warning, pumps for harnessing water for irrigation to replicate similar model of existing irrigation project in Kolowa.  Staffing – particularly extension officers are few for agriculture. Health facilities require additional staff.  Resource constraints	2.0
5.a	Answer for each relevant institution – when discussing if systems, process and resources are sufficient, use the test question if safety net benefits in recent years have in fact been provided in an adequate and timely manner.		
5.b	How does the day-to-day work of safety net management function? Are there any bottlenecks? What could be the underlying reasons for these? How do these differ from emergency assistance planning?	Funding flows and adequacy are a challenge for cash transfers, cash transfer for elderly people and people with severe disabilities. County government cannot provide complementary support or funds to these national cash transfer programmes. The implementation of the national social protection programme problematic. County assembly needs to develop regulations. Single Registry should work closely with counties and enable the harmonization of targeting across national and county programmes.	2.0
5.c	If there are any bottlenecks, which would be the most important functions to strengthen, and how could they be strengthened (different separation of tasks, revised work flows, more staff, training for staff, working equipment, operational budget, etc.)?		
6.	<b>Do comprehensive and effective multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms exist at national and county level with respect to managing and delivering safety nets? How do these differ in emergency and non-emergency situations? (CCC3)</b>	CSG brings together all stakeholders in the county. Safety nets often discussed. It is held both in non-emergency and emergency situations. Resource constraints cause the meetings not to be held regularly. There is a need to formalize the CSG terms of reference to guide the roles of each member.	3.0
7.	<b>What were/are the associations with development partners and have these changed over time, and if so, why/how? Which kind of resources are being provided by partners (financial, personnel, advisory role, etc.)? (CCC3)</b>	Funding has reduced from donors, for instance the USA used to fund health initiatives. UNICEF funding is scaled down for nutrition activities. SNV and EU funding for livestock fodder and marketing is also being scaled down. This could be due to normal project cycles ending, accountability issues, change in strategy. Since devolution, support continues to go to the central government. The donors have not yet understood the functions of the county governments and give little support directly. Treasury guidelines recently released on development partner engagement and financing with county governments should be reviewed to see how they facilitate the process of donors funding county government initiatives. Care supports a participatory scenario planning to discuss weather related disasters. The project was launched three years ago and is ongoing, bringing together all stakeholders. This was supported ASDSP and the meteorological department.	2.0
8.	<b>Are there accountability lines and functional coordination mechanisms across government stakeholders at different levels (national/county/community level) to ensure that needs of people that should be covered by safety nets (both emergency assistance and resilience building and recovery) are consistently met? If so, are additional capacity strengthening measures needed to enhance both internal control mechanisms and accountability? (CCC4)</b>	Accountability lines and coordination mechanisms exist. Coordination among county government ministries is done in the Cabinet meetings. There is a county committee for projects where the relevant Chief Officers have a stake. This is convened based when needed and when the project requires. This is not a regular body. These are called County Steering Committees. The Cos and project coordinator sits on it.  The use of funds is reported, mostly monthly. Technical working groups serve coordination purposes but are ad hoc. This applies for all sectors.	3.0
8.a	What is the coverage of programmes and the overall performance of institutions? Is the coverage based on the vulnerability definition and/or other criteria?	Health coverage is county-wide. Staff shortages and facilities are key performance issues. Some facilities are not operational and this makes it seem that performance is low. Vulnerability not factored in.  Livestock coverage is county-wide. There are staff shortages and challenges with mobility which means not all areas are reached. Not targeted.  Social sector at county level very slim, so utilizes national level staff and resources to accomplish the mission. Not targeted.	3.0

8.b	Are there clear targets for the coverage of programmes and the performance of safety net related institutions?	There are targets for coverage for programmes in each department (e.g. nutrition programme in health department) but not for safety nets. Social services have no specific targets. Work is planned based on available funding.	<b>3.0</b>
8.c	Is the performance of safety net related institutions monitored? How?	Yes. Through performance appraisals.	
8.d	Are there internal or external evaluations of institutional performance? If so, who carries them out and with which frequency?	Performance contracts (agreements between county and county senior management on their target achievements). Departments are ranked according to performance each quarter based on how well they achieved their targets. This applies to every sector. Performance appraisals are done for all staff by their supervisors. For this financial year, external evaluations of performance of programmes will be done for the first time.	
8.e	Are the results of institutional monitoring and evaluation systems readily accessible and available?	The results of departments are released so that they can learn and improve performance.	
8.f	What are their findings? Are there dissemination mechanisms to take action on recommendations coming out of these findings?	During the evaluation exercise, staff are made aware of areas for improvement. There are meetings where findings are shared.	
8.g	Do internal and external findings correspond? If not, why not and in which areas? If applicable, which measures could be undertaken to improve correspondence?	Not applicable.	
8.h	Which feedback mechanisms exist, e.g. is there a complaints and grievance mechanism that allows direct communication of communities to the lead institution(s) on SN?	Every department has a suggestion boxes. Extension officers provide reports with suggestions.	
<b>9.</b>	<b>Are relevant institutions able to manage risk and to learn and adapt depending on changing situations and needs in order to ensure that the needs of people for safety net benefits are efficiently and consistently met? In particular, how can institutions adapt in the changing nature of emergency assistance planning, resilience building and recovery? (CCC5)</b>	NDMA – yes. Documents learning and areas to improve after every project. Disaster risk reduction under the Deputy Governor. These issues addressed in county disaster policy, but until it is finalized, the NDMA plans are used. Livestock is building community capacity to adapt to climate change (e.g. drought tolerant crops, pasture conservation)	
9.a	Are there examples where adaption to changing needs worked – or did not work?	Pasture conservation has been a success. Working to introduce new rain water harvesting practices which has proven successful. Drought tolerant crop varieties have been introduced. Despite low rainfall, communities have been able to harvest.	
9.b	Do(es) the main institution(s) have an adequate risk management system that is adaptive to exogenous shocks?	Livestock offtakes are done in cases where drought is foreseen. Liaise with meteorological office for drought information. NDMA also has information on droughts. Weaker animals are sold off before prices fall. Currently systems are inadequate. County disaster policy is upcoming and it can fill in this gap.	<b>2.0</b>
9.c	How have previous and current exogenous shocks (if applicable, such as conflicts, natural disasters, etc.) affected the institution’s mission, service and effectiveness?	Cattle rustling causes closure of schools and markets. Insecurity blocks access to certain areas – no food distribution, no monitoring. Last May, markets in East Pokot were closed. The issue is sporadic and seasonal. Services paralysed during these periods, provided at a minimal level. Level 2	<b>2.0</b>
9.d	What have been the key programme revisions and modifications of the main institution(s)’ mission, and why/when did they occur?	Lack of access, resource constraints and other issues impact service provision and budget utilization. The low budget utilization affects the mission. When – during the implementation of project action plans.	<b>2.0</b>
9.e	Are the learning/professional development needs of staff provided for? If so, how?	At the sector level, yes. There is on-the-job training and external training. Staff can be released for studies. This is stipulated in public service policy at national level.	<b>3.0</b>
9.f	Is the institution’s level of technology appropriate to carry out its functions? Are there any updates to be made?	Yes. ICT training and equipment is needed.	<b>2.0</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 2:</b>			<b>2.7</b>

### HGI 3: Programme Financing and Strategic Planning

In most programmes, funds are inadequate. Funds that are available are not always easily accessed due to complex procedures. National advocacy is needed to increase budget allocations. Support with fund mobilization is also needed.

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	<b>Do government at central and county level and partners have committed funding for safety nets? (CCC1)</b>	County has allocated funds for the purpose but access issues.	<b>2.5</b>
1.a	I.e. is there an established budget line for the function at national and sub-national level?	Yes, at the county level. NDMA at the national level has a drought contingency fund.	
1.b	Is there an established budget line to support food insecure communities to build resilience to droughts?	Drought Contingency Fund, School feeding programme, general food distribution have budget lines at national level.	
1.c	Does the government have foreseeable budgets, enabling safety net related institutions to plan, budget and allocate internal and external resources in line with agreed priorities?	Deputy Governor's office have funds for this purpose but it is difficult to access it. The guidelines are not in place to regulate how it is distributed. Funds run out during the year.	
2.	<b>Does the government have sufficient material resources (financial, institutional) to ensure adequate and timely safety net coverage, including emergency assistance, recovery and resilience building? (i.e. is the available budget sufficient for the required action?) (CCC2)</b>	The funds are not sufficient. 2 percent of county budget is destined for disasters (currently 96 million per year). This is supposed to cover all needs in all sectors.	<b>2.0</b>
2.a	What is the share of available safety net funding as compared to present needs (present level of benefits reaching all people who would qualify for enrolment in a safety net programme)?	Around 50 percent	<b>2.0</b>
2.b	If the national budget does not allocate adequate funding for SN-related actions that address the SN targeted groups, are there any intentions to increase the budget in the near future? How much? Are there any indications by when such increase would take place?	Intentions are there. Additional resource mobilization is needed outside the county.	<b>2.0</b>
2.	<b>Do the national/county level budgets for the relevant SN programmes / activities correspond to the current needs and workload? (CCC2)</b>	No.	<b>2.0</b>
3.	<b>What is the government's and its national partners' capacity to efficiently manage financial resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and accountable funding for safety nets, including for emergency assistance, recovery and resilience building? (CCC2)</b>	The plans and staff capacity exist.	<b>3.0</b>
3.a	Are the funds foreseen for safety nets being disbursed to implementers in a timely manner and at the foreseen levels?	National Treasury replenishments are inconsistent. Disbursements are supposed to be done monthly but they are frequently late, max. 1-2 months.	<b>2.0</b>
3.b	Are there effective accountability structures and procedures that ensure the intended use of resources?	Yes. There are internal auditors, house committee for each department, scrutinising expenditure. IFMIS IT system is used for managing expenditure.	<b>4.0</b>
4.	<b>Does the government have the capacity to coordinate and engage with partners to diversify sources of funding for safety nets? How different is this in normal situations compared to emergency assistance, and recovery and resilience building? (CCC3)</b>	There is capacity. The Governor personally mobilizes resources, for instance from KOICA to support laptops for schools and dairy animals for vulnerable groups. Health has a new renal unit being built, ICU, and ambulances that were obtained through partners. JICA is supporting water projects. Departments generate concept notes/proposals for the Governor to use in mobilising resources.  In emergencies, seeds, beehives, fertilizers have been provided. Houses, roads and schools have been rebuilt with Directorate of Special Programmes and NYS funds.	<b>3.0</b>
4.a	How were the existing safety nets funded over the past five years? (mix of contributors)	Before devolution, the national government the main funder. County councils collected revenue and funded safety nets. World Vision used to fund child centred programmes, WASH projects, recovery project together with WFP and NDMA. Acted and ActionAid used to do cash for work, school WASH, livestock (restocking).  Currently, national government and county government continue to fund safety nets.  World Vision continues with the same projects.  Acted and ActionAid continue to support safety nets.	<b>3.0</b>

4.b	What was the share of the population identified to be in need of safety nets that actually received such assistance?		
<b>5.</b>	<b>Do established procedures for resource mobilization and funding allocation (and allocation of assistance per area) ensure consistency across geographical areas and interventions, yet are flexible enough to adapt to specific needs, in particular in emergency situations? (CCC4)</b>		
5.a	What is the relation between safety net resources provided by central and by county government?	National allocations to the county are late. County and national funds complement one another. County funds can be used to top up national funds and the other way around.	<b>2.0</b>
5.b	How are county and central government contributions coordinated?	Single pipeline idea came about because it was understood that there was double targeting and wastage. The single pipeline plan is finalized but implementation has to start. It concerns food for assets and general food distribution.	<b>3.0</b>
5.c	How do processes to arrive at resource allocations at the national/county level look like?	Programme based budgeting used at the county level for resource allocation.	<b>3.5</b>
5.d	Is there enough flexibility to accommodate different needs/contexts (e.g. different commodity prices or implementation costs across the country/ implementing agencies)?	E-procurement is being introduced. The procurement plans are flexible and factor in changing prices. Market analysis is done before procurement, including for implementing agencies. Implementing agencies compete for contracts.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>Are government and partners able to adapt resource allocations to safety nets in line with changing situations and needs? How does this in particular apply to emergency assistance, recovery and resilience building? (CCC5)</b>	Able to adapt to changing needs and situations. There are documents to guide this, e.g. contingency plans and preparedness plans.	<b>2.0</b>
6.a	How did identified needs vary over the past five years?	Climate variations: The approaches from the past do not work now due to the frequency of droughts. You need contingency plans. Technological change also increases needs (e.g. technology in schools). Understanding of programmes has changed: now there is a focus on asset creation, not just general food distribution.	
6.b	How did the level of resources provided for safety nets in each of these years adjust to the identified needs? (i.e. the share of identified needs that was actually covered)	There has been a small increase over time. Every financial year the budgets are increased slightly. Yet, programme costs have also increased.	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 3:</b>			<b>2.6</b>

#### HGI 4: Programme Design and Management

- Capacity building to design, implement and manage programmes
- Planning to adopt bottom up approach

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
<b>1.</b>	Are the stakeholders involved in the design, management and implementation of safety net programmes (regular and emergency assistance) ensuring compliance with national policies and standards? (CCC1)  Answering this question might require retrieval of and comparison with relevant standards for safety nets and humanitarian assistance, e.g. SPHERE	Partners align the programmes with the CIDP. CIDP is automatically in line with the national policies. The community participates in budget-making by making proposals to the county government. All county initiatives have to be linked to national programmes. For instance, when county was planning its cash transfer programme for elderly and severely disabled, it wanted to provide a higher transfer value than the government but had to adapt the design to fit the national policy. The government has to approve the initiatives and ensures that they are aligned. The county budget can only be used towards activities in the CIDP.	<b>3.0</b>
1.a	Are there clear national protocols on how to provide safety nets of emergency assistance, do these correspond to international standards (as far as Kenya has subscribed to them), and are they being adhered to be actual programme implementation?	Does not apply at county level	
1.b	Do safety net/emergency assistance implementers comply with national guidelines, protocols, standards and procedures (e.g. targeting/beneficiary selection, modalities and rations/food baskets, quality assurance mechanisms, etc.)?	Yes.	
1.c	Provide examples of stakeholder involvement in the design, management and implementation of SN programmes.	PRRO: WV does a cluster wide proposal for three years based on participatory rural appraisal. The proposal is shared in the county steering committee for approval. WV targets the most vulnerable households. Communities work on their identified projects and are compensated for their work based on a distribution plan approved by the county administration and WFP.  KCB foundation supports farmers, dairy, beekeeping activities.	<b>4.0</b>



2.	<b>Does the government and its partners have adequate resources (technical knowledge, time, personnel, finances, etc.) to design and implement adequate and timely safety net assistance/emergency assistance to the population identified as being in need? (CCC2)</b>		2.5
2.a	Which safety net programmes (productive/social, cash for assets or equivalent) are set in place? Provide some examples.	<p>FFA in PRRO</p> <p>Cash transfer for elderly and severely disabled (county and national government)</p> <p>Cash for work by Acted</p> <p>Youth and women fund – national and county</p> <p>Food vouchers by Acted</p> <p>National Hospital Insurance Fund – national government</p> <p>Orphans and Vulnerable Children by national government</p> <p>School feeding programme – WFP</p> <p>Home Grown School Meals Programme – government</p>	
2.b	Who implements current safety nets/emergency assistance, and how? Are there challenges that are being faced to achieve efficient and effective delivery?	<p>FFA – challenges with NFIs (tools), delays in transferring the food to beneficiaries because of pipeline breaks. Community contribution is difficult because of seasons not behaving as expected.</p> <p>Cash transfers lack funds and so not sufficient people in need.</p> <p>The women and youth fund wanted to reach 420 groups in the first quarter but only 90 were reached. Only Ksh. 10 million funds available.</p> <p>Cash transfers for elderly and disabled – still working on aligning with national government regulations. The budget is also 10 million for this financial year but no transfers have been made. The county assembly has to come up with the laws and regulations for the process of identification, disbursement, beneficiaries and who will administer the fund.</p>	
2.c	How many people (and share of population) are assisted under existing safety nets (regular and emergency situations)?	<p>PRRO: 26,600 beneficiaries</p> <p>Women and youth fund: 420 groups or around 8400 people</p> <p>Elderly and disabled: 90 people</p> <p>Orphans and Vulnerable Children: TBC</p> <p>School feeding: 106 schools, 27,514 pupils</p> <p>Home grown school meals: 65,472 in four sub-counties</p> <p>Supplementary feeding: 48 out of 106 facilities implementing the IMAM. 1269 male and 1414 female 2170 pregnant and lactating women. The figures are fluctuating.</p> <p>Food vouchers: 400 households in East Pokot</p> <p>Cash for work: 4250 people in East Pokot</p> <p>Hospital insurance fund: 400 people</p> <p>Agriculture seed distribution to disable people: TBC</p> <p>Rapid response initiative: 5000 people</p>	
2.d	What is the share of people identified as being in need that is actually covered by present safety nets/emergency assistance?	We can compare with short rains assessment findings	
2.e	Do current safety net programmes/emergency assistance achieve national targets (if any)? How is this monitored? If not, how can results be improved to achieve such targets?	<p>In FFA, all those who are targeted are reached. Targeting depends on assessment findings. M&amp;E unit gives the field office monthly target of 10 percent and a sample of sites to be monitored. There are defined monitoring tools. The same monitoring system applies in the school feeding programme and supplementary feeding.</p> <p>Women and youth groups: 420 groups were the objective.</p> <p>Hospital fund: The targets that can be reached are based on the funds available and voluntary members. Ksh 600,000 available for 2015-16.</p>	
3.	<b>Are methodologies in place that ensure adequate, timely and accountable provision of safety net/emergency assistance? (CCC2)</b>		
3.a	Do existing government safety nets cover the most vulnerable areas of the county? How does that adapt to emergency situations?		

3.b	<p>Are appropriate targeting methodologies in place, and are staff and partners trained to apply these (regular and emergency assistance)? If so, which? Have any internal or external evaluations of current safety nets been carried out? If so, what did they report on inclusion and exclusion errors? What is being done/could be done to improve current targeting mechanisms?</p>	<p>CSG has a relief distribution committee that seeks to improve these methodologies as there has been some double dipping. The single pipeline will be introduced. This means that all assistance will go through the committee who will distribute it to vulnerable groups in a fair manner. There will be guidelines for targeting but the targeting method to be used is not yet clear.</p> <p>There are community based targeting guidelines done jointly with WFP and the Government. These have been shared with the CSG for information. Yet, Directorate of Special Programmes food goes directly to sub-county level, which means that the CSG cannot control the targeting process. Deputy County Commissioner and sub-county administrators decide on targeting at the sub-county level. Single pipeline will try to ensure that the food goes through the CSG.</p> <p>In agriculture, extension officers identify vulnerable groups – disabled people.</p> <p>In social services, for youth and women groups, there is a ward credit committee that gives recommendations for who to target. There are clear criteria for identification of the groups.</p> <p>With RRI, targeting was controversial. The government MoA set a target of 5000 acres or people. The targeting was done in Nairobi without consulting the county government. There was a conflict of interest. The MPs wanted to identify the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were not the people in most need.</p>	2.0
3.c	<p>Are systems in place for the screening of the affected population?</p>	<p>There is screening at different levels.</p> <p>Community based targeting does this</p> <p>Supplementary feeding screens at the level of individual beneficiaries at the facilities.</p> <p>In East Pokot there was a mass screening to confirm GAM rates in 2014.</p>	
3.d	<p>Are systems in place for the registration of beneficiaries of safety nets/emergency assistance?</p>	<p>World Vision uses LMMS to register beneficiaries.</p> <p>In emergency food distribution, currently no clear registration system.</p>	2.0
3.e	<p>Are systems in place that ensure full accountability of the use of resources for safety nets/emergency assistance? How much of the programmatic inputs are reaching the intended beneficiaries? What are the main causes if foreseen resources are not reaching intended beneficiaries?</p>	<p>Money is likely to get diverted.</p> <p>Food is likely to get diverted. There is not a clear mechanism that ensures that the food reaches the intended beneficiaries. From county level, the food is apportioned to sub-counties, and onwards to wards and villages. There is little monitoring.</p> <p>NGO distribution mechanisms have accountability and monitoring systems that reduce the likelihood of diversion. (LMMS, reporting systems, community complaints mechanisms). These would be useful to share with the county.</p>	1.0
4.	<p><b>Are the contents of programmes including their performance, transfer values, delivery and targeting mechanisms and the capacity of staff adequate to achieve national targets? Has this been assessed previously? If so, what do results reveal? If not, which criteria are particularly relevant to the government? (CCC2)</b></p>		
5.	<p><b>Are there effective partnerships for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and resource mobilization established for permanent and emergency-related safety needs addressing the needs of affected groups? (CCC3)</b></p>		3.5
5.a	<p>Which partnerships exist for the implementation of safety nets? To what extent are the civil society, the private sector and community members engaged in programme design and service delivery?</p>	<p>World vision partners with government ministries and WFP, NDMA, the community to implement programmes. Funding constraints are a challenge for partnerships. Design of programmes is done collectively to ensure that they are aligned with the CIDP. Acted works with the government and NDMA. Action Aid, Red Cross are also present.</p> <p>The county government engages civil society and partners at the county and sub-county levels during the development of CIDP.</p>	
5.b	<p>Which of these are sustainable?</p>	<p>The engagement with NGOs is long-term and sustainable as it is a precondition for their work in the county.</p> <p>World Vision and WFP have partnership agreements with close county government engagement. WWI and the community also have agreements. Otherwise, partnership agreements not common.</p>	
5.c	<p>Can partnerships be increased?</p>	<p>Yes.</p>	
5.d	<p>How much more coverage could be achieved if the sustainable partnerships would be increased?</p>	<p>The remaining 50 percent of the vulnerable population.</p>	



6.	<b>Is there a clear coordination mechanism in place for both more permanent and emergency assistance safety nets (e.g. different national or county-level programmes)? (CCC3)</b>	NDMA is a key coordinator.	
7.	<b>Is the design and implementation of interventions addressing needs of affected groups coherent nationwide and are there implementation procedures and mechanisms in place to ensure consistency of service delivery and monitoring activities, yet flexible enough to adapt to local needs? (CCC4)</b>	National level programmes are not sufficiently responsive to the county level realities. Distribution of resources is defined at the national level but this does not meet needs at county level.	<b>2.0</b>
7.a	Are SN programmes adapted to rural and urban vulnerability distributions, distributions by state, age, gender, formal/informal sector and others as deemed relevant?	Not relevant.	
7.b	Has the government planned and used different transfer modalities to populations in need in the past years?	Food and cash at the moment. Cash transfers are a new modality. The county is learning to put in place the structures in place to make cash transfers work. There are county management committees who work on identifying the groups, after which the administrator channels the cash to the groups and follows up with the groups to recover the loan. In agriculture, the actual inputs are distributed (not cash or vouchers).	
7.c	Does the county have guidelines for using different modalities (e.g. general food distributions, asset creation, cash transfers)?	There are guidelines for general food distribution but these need improvement - the single pipeline. The single pipeline guidelines are almost finished. There is a regulation for the transfer of funds in the youth and women fund. A regulation is being written for the elderly/disabled programme (pending county assembly adoption). The national programme has guidelines and regulations but these are being adapted to the county. There is not FFA guideline at the county government level. May be necessary in the future.	
7.d	Does the government conduct market analysis to support cash or voucher interventions?	No.	
7.e	Are existing programmes mindful of the different roles of men and women in households and communities?	There is a national law stipulating that a third of public tenders has to go to women and youth and people with disabilities. In FFA, female household heads are mostly targeted to ensure that the assistance reaches the children. Also, in the committees in charge of the projects, at least 50 percent are held by women and the chair is always a woman. At least one third of the committee in women/youth group programme has to be women.	<b>3.5</b>
7.f	Do the programmes ensure that women, children and the elderly have access to programmes and/or are captured in other SN programmes otherwise?		
7.g	How resources (funds and food) are allocated, prioritized and reprioritized during an ongoing response?		
8.	<b>Does the county have an approach to identify which assistance/support is required where and when, and does it balance emergency planning with ongoing projects, and advise on areas that have gaps? (CCC4)</b>	Sub-county administrators should ensure that their areas get their needs covered. They have information of who does what where and what the gaps are. They can make proposals to the relevant departments. The members of county assemblies lobby for their constituencies. NDMA coordinates responses and has information of partners programmes. NDMA did a stakeholder mapping in 2013 to understand who is doing what. The mapping can be redone when needed.	<b>3.0</b>
9.	<b>Do programmes addressing the needs of affected groups have mechanisms in place to assess and adapt to lessons learned and changing situations and are these used effectively? How do these differ in times of emergencies? (CCC5)</b>		
9.a	Is there a monitoring system to measure the effectiveness of safety nets in terms of processes (registration, targeting, data management, etc.)? If so, how are outcomes/impacts being measured and which data is being used? Do we know if existing safety net programmes enhance the ability of households to manage risks by reducing the probability of a shock and overall vulnerability?		

9.b	If results are below the target or expectations, what are the reasons? Which measures have been taken/are going to be taken to address the issue?		
9.c	Is historical data available to cross-check, learn from patterns in the past and launch projections?	Data is available on request. NDMA has a lot of data from different sectors, NDMA consolidates during assessments.	
9.d	Are programmes innovative? If considered yes, specify innovative measures that have been/are being taken? Which are the increases in concrete outputs/outcomes with respect to efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability that have been achieved under specific innovative measures?		
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 4:</b>			<b>3.0</b>

### HGI 5: Continuity and Sustained National Capacity/Civil Society Voice

- Empowering communities through income generating activities.
- Linking the vulnerable groups to social safety nets. Possibly introducing a county database for vulnerable groups.
- Inform the community of programmes and create ownership and buy-in. Ensure that communities contribute something to the programmes. Advocacy, communication and social mobilization is required so that communities understand programmes are for their benefit. Community consultation should be always done to ensure programmes meet community needs.

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	Does the government have a long-term strategy or vision for provision of more permanent safety nets/emergency assistance in the future? Does this strategy or vision have tangible effects at county level? Does this vision include any major change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors, and between central and sub-national levels of government? (CCC1)	CIDP is anchored in vision 2030. The cash transfers and other programmes are in the CIDP 2013-2017. Each department develops plans based on the CIDP. All sectors are now working on 5-year strategic plans within the framework of the CIDP.	
2.	Are the civil society, communities and the private sector at the central and county levels committed to addressing the needs of targeted/affected groups? Are these commitments tailored in a sustainable way? (CCC1)	WVI seeks to involve county stakeholders in processes to ensure that once WVI exits, the programmes continue. The same applies for Acted and other NGOs.	
3.	Is national funding stable and are resources available for safety nets/emergency assistance? (CCC2)	Funding from the Treasury is stable but insufficient. This includes the county 2 percent allocation for emergencies. There are inconsistencies in the fund flow.	
3.a	What has been the level of resources for safety nets/emergency assistance in the past five years?	The level of resourcing is low and there is need to step it up.	
3.b	What has been the share of resource requirements that has been covered in the past five years?		
3.c	What has been the share of resources mobilized by national and county governments for these activities in the past TWO years?	Most of the resources come from the national government. Also development partners.	
3.d	What are the prospects for each of these questions in the medium-term future?		
4.	Are there systems and resources available for civil society, communities, and private sector's participation in the development and management of safety nets/emergency assistance, and for monitoring and feedback at the national and county levels? Are these systems and resources sustainable? (CCC2)		
5.	Does government lead the present system of safety nets/emergency assistance? Does the present system rest on a secure (multiple-sourced) basis of resources, and are back-up plans in place, or does it depend on the goodwill of one or few external partners? (CCC3)	The national government funding is sustainable as it is in the Constitution.  Some programmes, for example the HIV programme funded through the Global Fund, are very costly and funded by development partners. There is a risk of donors withdrawing.  WFP is handing over the school feeding component to county governments effective January 2016. Baringo County did not factor this during the budgeting process for the 2015/16 fiscal year. There is a transition strategy for school feeding that foresees the remaining part of Baringo County which is still under WFP's in-kind school feeding programme transition to Home Grown School Meals Programme in 2-3 years' time.	<b>2.0</b>

6.	<b>Are civil society, communities and the private sector actively contributing resources and are they engaged in designing and implementing activities addressing the needs of affected groups? Are mobilized resources and partnerships sustainable to plan, design and implement necessary activities? (CCC3)</b>		
6.a	Are the roles and responsibilities of the community and civil society clearly defined?	Constitution, sectoral workplans, programme guidelines regulate the roles and responsibilities.	4.0
6.b	Are there any strategies in place to mobilize the civil society/communities at the local level (e.g. participatory approaches, outreach activities)?	Civil society are mobilized and participate in most of the activities done by the government. The participation is done through meetings, workshops, seminars.	
7.	<b>How is information and analysis of safety nets/emergency assistance and its results stored and accessed? Is this information available to government, the public and the international community (where appropriate)? (CCC4)</b>	Information for specific sectors is available at the sector level. In health, there is a DHIS health information system that is accessible to all publics. In agriculture and livestock, there is no central database, but the information is stored by individual staff. For planning, there is a survey office and the land registry that manage and can provide information. For social services, there is also no information management systems, everything is in files. NDMA, there is an information department that manages and shares information. WVI has a CTS/LMMS department that manages information.	
7.a	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the relevant authorities?	Yes for all sectors	
7.b	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the general public?	Yes for all sectors.	
8.	<b>Has a flexible and strategic approach to work with communities, the civil society, and the private sector been developed to ensure their consistent participation and engagement in safety net provision/emergency assistance to the affected population? Is this approach sustainable? (CCC4)</b>	Yes. Community participation is a constitutional issue and therefore it has to be done in all programming. This is sustainable. Communities are able to take part in the programmes that benefit them. In emergencies, consultation is less due to the need to act fast. Yet, communities participate in developing the contingency plan for emergencies.	3.5
8.a	Are relationships with civil society organizations adjusted based on their strengths and weaknesses for partnership and programmatic needs?	The civil society has a watchdog and whistleblowing role.	
8.b	Are authorities able to balance the interests of all stakeholders?	The county government treats all organizations equally and provides a conducive environment for them to work. NGO workplans need to be shared with the county, CSG.	
9.	<b>Do the civil society, communities and the private sector contribute to the country's/county's learning and to incorporating lessons learned and good practices to sustain adequate safety net/emergency assistance activities for affected groups? (CCC5)</b>	There is sharing of learning experiences and good practices. The learning event in May was a good example. Private sector meets in investment conferences to share their information and experiences. Baringo is organizing an investor conference by the end of 2015. The planning is ongoing. There are plans to open an information office/resource centre for the county. An area for improvement is better documentation and management of data in the different sectors. Learning events are expensive to organize.	3.0
		<b>Aggregate score for HGI 5:</b>	<b>3.2</b>

# ANNEX 2: BARINGO CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AREA 1

## Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis

HGI 1: Policy and Legislative Environment			
No.	Question	County	
1.	Is the importance of hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security and nutrition being reflected in national and/or county level policies, strategies, laws etc.? (CCC1)	<p>At national level, Food &amp; nutrition policy in place at the national level. EDE broadly spells out the measures to manage drought.</p> <p>Legal framework and policy at the county are available. CIDPs also address some of the issues, Devolution Act and Emergency Fund Act. Disaster management regulation and policy in place for the county. 2 percent of the total budget set aside for emergency relief.</p> <p>Need for additional legislation to strengthen coordination, e.g. the CSG support, and responsibilities.</p> <p>Relief food distribution guideline guides food distribution in single pipeline channel.</p> <p>'Last mile' details not fully supported e.g. targeting and logistical support.</p>	2.5
1.a	Which are they? List relevant instruments from the constitution to national development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable.	<p>At national level, EDE, Food &amp; Nutrition policy, Bill of rights.</p> <p>At county level, CIDP is in the process of review to domesticate and give life the county level policies. The National nutrition action plan has been domesticated but not incorporated in the CIDP neither has it been adopted by the County Assembly. The food and nutrition policy not domesticated.</p> <p>A county drought contingency plan is in place, but the extent of adoption by various stakeholders including the BCG is not determinate. It has not been reviewed in two years, and adopted. Preparedness activities incorporated in the contingency plan be isolated from the drought contingency plan. There is new information at ward level (19 wards already covered). Disaster emergency plans which need to be captured to update the county plan.</p> <p>The contingency plan elaborates roles and responsibilities of different actors within the county government, in handling emergencies.</p> <p>Early warning bulletins generated by the NDMA, which informs the activation of the contingency activities. The funding for disasters is currently pegged only on response activities.</p> <p>It is essential to create standard operating procedures s and guidelines and competences in order to facilitate timely response.</p>	
1.b	Are these instruments up-to-date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to devolved government?	<p>To some extent CIDP due for update. EDE action plan also needs to be updated.</p> <p>Policy in place seems to relate only to water and food. It needs to be updated to include other areas of education, agriculture etc.</p> <p>Each department is currently being encouraged to develop strategic plan that mainstreams disaster risk reduction into operations and programmes.</p>	
1.c	Are there widely and jointly agreed indicators, which capture acute deviations from the norm to trigger early warning and action? Give examples	<p>Systems in place at the national level through NDMA.</p> <p>For drought yes, for other hazards, no. To some extent, some involvement of national agencies to cope with eventualities of climate change and other natural disasters.</p>	

2.	<b>Do relevant instruments efficiently and effectively address emergency preparedness and response needs of vulnerable groups (CCC2)</b>	Plans in place through the drought contingency plan.	<b>3.0</b>
	Are they supported by adequate legislation and regulations	Yes	
	Are they translated into action plans with clear responsibilities, results frameworks and timelines	Yes, but weaknesses around ownership and periodic updates.	
1.a	Do the hazard analyses that are currently carried out include food security/nutrition as an area of specific thematic analysis?	Yes, nutrition is incorporated in all assessments. Regular surveillance captures nutrition indicators but only 40 percent of the county is monitored.	
1.a	Are there gaps? Which?	<p>Sentinel sites do not cover the whole county... only 40 percent of the county covered... for historical reasons... Arid lands only covered the area. NDMA to consider creating additional sites, capacity and resourcing.</p> <p>Strengthening community response mechanisms based on info available to them.</p> <p>Resourcing and funding has gaps.</p> <p>There is a project (Regional Pastoral livelihoods resilience project) rolling out which is expected to add 12 sentinel sites over the next 5yrs. Sustainability is the key concern at this point.</p>	
3.	<b>Are the relevant instruments being implemented? (CCC2)</b>		
3.a	State implementation status for each identified instrument:		
	CIDPs/PFM/Devolved government act, Public procurement Act		
	Disaster management policy		
	Drought contingency plan	<p>Drought response has not followed the set thresholds stipulated in the plan.</p> <p>Drought parameters are known for the various drought phases. Resourcing has affected timeliness of interventions. Political influence on the decision making as opposed to merit and accurate information available from the drought bulletins...</p>	
	County nutrition action plan	Mostly supported by the partners and civil society organizations. The gaps entail operationalization of funding for emergency response.	
	EDE Framework		
4.	<b>When devising instruments related to hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis, has the government established partnerships with relevant key stakeholders (UN, civil society, private sector, research institutes, other governments, etc.), specifically with those players that have a direct role in promoting emergency preparedness and response activities? (CCC3)</b>	Yes, NDMA, KRC, Acted. A number of private sector organizations involved	
5.	<b>Do national and county development plans, and other instruments supporting hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security/nutrition establish links to other relevant instruments and programmes? (E.g. when the number of people in need of assistance is assessed, does this adequately take into account all sources of support available to the vulnerable population? (CCC4)</b>	<p>It has not been done previously at the county level structures, challenges with obtaining information from beneficiaries on what other support they could be getting. No database to check whether beneficiaries benefit from other programmes. The database is not harmonized. The stand lone databases need to be consolidated and mapped using ICT infrastructure to have all data centralized and accessible to all actors, civil society organizations, county government &amp; UN agencies. The data base at the county level is basically a manual one based on excel sheets. Some civil society organizations have beneficiaries' management systems which use biometrics to identify beneficiaries. The Health Department maintains registers for beneficiaries which is further consolidated into a DHIS.</p> <p>There is need to promote best practice among the agencies... such as transparency and accountability, reporting.</p> <p>The arid and semi-arid lands forum currently has a web based system which can be borrowed to enhance programme management. The Deputy Governor's office attempted to run a single pipeline which is intended to bring together a single registry for the county. The resourcing remains a challenge.</p>	<b>2.0</b>

6.	<b>Are the relevant national and sub-national instruments in support of hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security and nutrition responsive to changing situations and needs? (CCC5)</b>	<p>The county contingency plan is responsive but it has not been reviewed and updated. The resourcing of the technical team to review and update the plan has been a challenge. The resourcing has also hampered the flexibility such that whenever some items are not budgeted for, it would not be flexible enough to accommodate purchase. Normal lead times to access funds for emergencies take a week or two, which is still too long for an emergency situation. A rethink should be done in order to have faster response plans. Plans and approvals easily amount to delays and more needs to be done to review.</p> <p>In terms of resilience building, there is room for flexibility unlike emergency response.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
6.a	Have the early warnings given in recent years led to relevant actions from the institutional level?	Yes: for the last year. Prior to devolution, appeals were sent to the National office whereby intervention types and resource mobilization would be done. There were delays. CNTF exists at the county level at the moment which feeds into the National Nutritional Forum.	
6.b	Has this resulted in appropriate action at the community level?	Appropriate actions have been carried out at the community level, whereby the communities activated their coping strategies. More often than not, the community has delayed in responding, rather adopting a wait and see strategies. The time lag has made them more vulnerable and created losses despite the early warnings.	
6.c	Have the early warnings given in recent years been at appropriate times?	Yes	
6.d	Is there a maintenance plan developed to keep data current and updated?	<p>Yes: The monitoring part for the early warning systems are in place. The response plans are not updated. The HH numbers and actual population is dynamic information is not captured. Within the health sector, annual smart surveys are carried out to update and maintain data.</p> <p>There is a need to develop a maintenance plan for the data to become reliable. The level of recovery varies from one household to another, hence the level of capacity development at household level should be conducted to facilitate recovery.</p>	
6.e	Which have been the main challenges and how have they been addressed/are planned to be addressed in the future?	<p>Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tool has been presented to the county management and may prove useful if adopted in the days ahead. Interagency rapid response action.</p> <p>Resourcing a major challenge.</p> <p>Personnel capacity &amp; competence challenges: multi-disciplinary participation required yet the systems are such that technical persons that can be deployed to do rapid assessments are few. Standardization of tools at county level have not been set aside for purposes of the different assessments.</p> <p>Community awareness to respond has been a challenge. A flag system has been adopted to raise different colours of flags to trigger particular responses from the community. The challenge in this instance has been the coverage, which is still limited to 40 percent.</p> <p>Community feedback meetings have been held but limited by resources. Early warning information is disseminated. CM disaster risk reduction has been presented to the county and 19 wards out of 30 have discussed and developed disaster preparedness and response plans. The plans are multi-hazard and can be more useful if they are tailored to be hazard specific.</p> <p>The guideline on single pipeline was shared by the National Special Programmes and there is currently a standing committee to consolidate the database for the relief and assistance operating in the county. Initial steps have been made, as far as constituting a committee to monitor how relief is done within the county. There is need to harmonize and consolidate the plans on a priority basis.</p> <p>Capacity for response standards... need to build the capacity of the county response mechanisms with standard operating procedures and sphere standards.</p>	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 1:</b>			<b>2.5</b>



HGI 2: Effective and Accountable Institutions			
No.	Question	County	
1.	Is there a designated lead institution within the national and/or county government with clearly defined role and responsibility for the function of hazard analysis, early warning, food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC1). If yes, name them.	<p>The county is in the process of establishing a county disaster management unit. A provision has been made in the 2015/16 budget for its operationalization.</p> <p>CSG is the coordinating organ in disaster risk reduction/emergency preparedness and response. The coordination is basically based on good will, it is essential to embed the existence of the CSG in a policy document.</p> <p>Some counties have legislated to domesticate institutional arrangements within a legal framework of operations.</p> <p>ACTED has been active on the early warning systems, and supported the provision of the flags. The introduction of the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tool is ongoing, at the capacity building level.</p>	2.5
1.a	Is there an existing institutional framework within the national/sub-national government with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the function?	<p>NDMA: shares the early warnings widely with all stakeholders in an existing framework.</p> <p>National Disaster Operations Centre chips in where the disasters are beyond the scope of the county.</p>	
1.b	If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or even contradict each other?	<p>There are several institutions NDMA, KRC, World Vision Kenya &amp; ACTED.</p> <p>NDMA has the core mandate of early warning and food security assessment in the county. While other institutions carry out some data collection at the same level, they triangulate their information with NDMA, however, most of their data collected is for their internal use and programming.</p> <p>KRC &amp; WFP have at times duplicated the assistance programmes in the school meals programme. The duplication and wastage of resources results from an overlap of mandates. A lack of coordination leads to double or triple funding for some programmes while some other programmes remain underfunded. Some level of marginalization is observed to result from the duplication. Equitable distribution of resources is hampered. The mandates of various agencies contradict each other where some agencies are more focused on the emergency response while others are preparedness oriented.</p>	
1.c	Do the levels of hazard in the food security and nutrition phase classification link to an early warning and vulnerability analysis process?	Yes: The Nutrition Department does smart surveys in areas that have been flagged off by NDMA early warning bulletins. Long rains assessments and short rains assessments provide useful information for analysis.	
1.d	Are there gaps, i.e. areas within early warning, food security and vulnerability analysis for which no national/county level institution has a mandate? If yes, list them.	<p>Yes: The drought monitoring and early warning systems are in place... there are gaps in the monitoring of other hazards.</p> <p>The SMART (specific, measurable, assignable, realistic, time-related) survey is supported by the civil society organizations, and only a few parts of the county is covered. Data for the whole county is not available.</p>	
1.e	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that all people vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition are adequately covered by hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis?	Both yes and no: the legal mandates of institutions overlap, so by mandate, all vulnerable groups are covered. However, due to the overlap and lack of coordination, some people receive multiple benefits while others receive nothing – in a situation where resources are sufficient to cover only 40 percent of the needs in the county.	
2.	Are the roles/responsibilities of the different stakeholders and administrative levels (sub-national and national) clearly defined for the function? (CCC2)	Yes, roles are distinctly defined. Legislation pieces are in various stages of completion.	3.0

3.	Do relevant institutions have the systems, processes and resources (e.g. in terms of staff, knowledge, guidelines/procedures and equipment) to be efficient and accountable? Provide answers for each relevant institution that might be part of the coordination mechanisms at the county level; e.g. is there sufficient staff, and does relevant staff have sufficient knowledge and skills to ensure regular and undisrupted hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security/nutrition? (CCC2)	NDMA has some level of staffing and systems while the county government is still working on the systems, processes and personnel  More staff capacity development needs to be done, and more systems and processes.  NDMA only covers 40 percent of the county in terms of monitoring and sites.	2.0
4.	Are hazard analysis and early warning systems adequately linked to food security and vulnerability assessments, and response analyses, and the triggering of response action within the prevailing institutional architecture both at national and sub-national level to address identified levels of vulnerability? i.e. if the analysis points to food insecurity, does this trigger an assistance process? (CCC3)	The information received may not be representative of the whole county but that which is received triggers action.	3.0
5.	Are there accountability lines and functional coordination mechanisms across government stakeholders at different levels (national/county/community level) to ensure that needs of people that should be covered under hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis are consistently met? (CCC4)	CSG in place but terms of reference to be reviewed. Accountability is clear, and audit is done once a year from the Auditor General's office. Civil society organizations and NDMA's have other audit processes. A social audit is currently ongoing to confirm whether the needs of vulnerable populations are consistently being met.	3.0
6.	Are relevant institutions able to manage risk and to learn and adapt depending on changing situations and needs in order to ensure that needs of people are efficiently and consistently met? – e.g. how do institutions identify and respond to changing needs or levels of vulnerability? (CCC5)	Learning management and adaptation happens but mostly undocumented... information sharing should be encouraged.  Programme designs do not support sharing of lessons learnt. There is need for capacity building in this area of programming. Water trucking during the rainy seasons because of system rigidities. More flexibility needs to be incorporated in the programme design as it is lacking under the current framework.  Resource diversions often raise audit queries.  Information availability from Early warning bulletins support risk management strategies. Informed planning is in place to facilitate resource mobilization.	2.5
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 2:</b>			<b>2.7</b>

**HGI 3: Programme Financing and Strategic Planning**

No.	Question	County	
1.	<b>Have government at central and county level and national partners committed funding for hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security and nutrition, i.e. is there an established budget line for the function at national and sub-national level? (CCC1)</b>	<p>NDMA has funding but is biased towards drought early warnings and not other hazards.</p> <p>At county level, no funds have been set aside specifically for early warning and hazard analysis. The PFM states categorically that the funding will only be for emergency response.</p> <p>Future budgeting processes within disaster management should incorporate funding for early warning activities and response activities.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
2.	<b>Does the government at central and county level have sufficient material resources (financial, institutional) to ensure regular and undisrupted hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security and nutrition, i.e. is the available budget sufficient for the required action? (CCC2)</b>	<p>At national level, project based funds available on need basis, for emergency response.</p> <p>Specific requests based on magnitudes of disasters are made to the National government for purposes or response.</p> <p>The Drought Contingency Fund is set aside specifically for drought related hazards. Drought Contingency Fund is sufficient and most counties were able to access funds based on requests. Disaster risk reduction is well taken care of at the moment.</p> <p>Flexibility at the special programmes directorate seems to disadvantage counties. Strain on resourcing for other hazards.</p> <p>At county level, only 2 percent of funding is foreseen for emergency response, which is inadequate, considering the multiple hazards and the response activities.</p> <p>Funding not sufficient and timely at the county level.</p> <p>Thresholds to determine the level of response required. Rapid assessments are carried out which determine the kind of response required from the national government or international community.</p> <p>The 2 percent mark is a provision of the PFM Act.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
3.	<b>Does the government at central and county level and its national partners have the capacity to efficiently manage financial resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and accountable funding for hazard analysis, early warning and food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC2)</b>	<p>Capacity enhancement needs to be done at the county level. The inherent capacity is inadequate to meet do the emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>Resourcing is still inadequate. Prioritization of activities often has to be done, in some instances leaving out some key activities which don't happen to rank high on the priority list.</p> <p>NDMA has access to skills and expertise is unhindered, but resourcing/funding remains a challenge.</p> <p>The county has the capacity to efficiently manage the resources availed to them. Drought Contingency Fund is managed on a web based platform which makes it possible to access the funding in a timely manner.</p> <p>Public Procurement procedures complicate the efficiency in responding to emergencies.</p> <p>Involvement in emergency preparedness and response activities is multi-stakeholder, each with their own business systems. Standardization of systems and processes needs to be considered in order to harmonize the efforts of all actors in emergency preparedness and response. Coordination to be reviewed so as to make emergency preparedness and response more efficient.</p> <p>Procurement procedures for emergency preparedness and response need to be set out within the Public Procurement Act, so as to facilitate efficiency in delivering assistance. Accountability needs to be enforced in regular and emergency scenarios.</p> <p>Lead times for procurements need to be minimized without compromising transparency and accountability. International sourcing of commodities not locally available needs to be reviewed.</p>	<b>2.5</b>

<p><b>4.</b></p>	<p><b>Does the government at central and county level have the capacity to coordinate and engage with partners to diversify sources of funding for hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC3)</b></p>	<p>Coordination mechanisms exist at the county level, where various stakeholders are engaged.</p> <p>The mechanisms need to be strengthened, with some documentation of the agreements in form of SLAs and MoUs.</p> <p>The Capacity to engage and mobilize partners needs to be developed at the county level, in order to diversify the sources of funding.</p> <p>Counties have the capacity within the Devolution Act to autonomously engage in resource mobilization by way of engagements with the international actors. Clearance from national government needs to be sought, and declaration is required for all activities. Documentation and adoption by the County Assembly is the usual procedure for external partner engagements.</p> <p>Coordination and liaison office (Disaster management liaison office) to synergize the efforts of the actors in emergency preparedness and response.</p> <p>Technical working group were supposed to provide an opportunity for all sectors to engage and provide useful information on various sectorial priority areas within the auspices of continuous engagements.</p>	<p><b>2.0</b></p>
<p>4.a</p>	<p>How was the management of hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis funded over the past five years? (mix of contributors)</p>	<p>County government has only existed for two years.</p> <p>Various agencies have supported in the emergency preparedness and response activities.</p>	
<p><b>5.</b></p>	<p><b>Do established procedures for resource mobilization and funding allocation ensure consistency across geographical areas and interventions, yet are flexible enough to adapt to specific needs? (CCC4)</b></p>	<p>Rapid assessments determine the ultimate targeting for resource allocation. The quality of the assessment reports is wanting, capacity needs to be enhanced to improve the quality of the reporting.</p> <p>Areas of interest in Drought management transcend various sectors including health, education etc.</p> <p>The response to emerging disasters happens in a timely way.</p> <p>Political interference affects some of the response activities especially with regard to the targeting.</p> <p>VAM is done geographically to determine the target beneficiaries. Ranking is done to determine the specific needs to respond to on a priority basis.</p> <p>Affected sectors of government should engage further so that the various interventions can have high impacts on the beneficiaries.</p> <p>Optimal resource utilization can be enhanced by a coordination mechanism in emergency preparedness and response.</p> <p>CSG is already in place, various committees need to be strengthened along the sectors, so that all hazards are covered. There is need to also have coordination mechanisms at the sub-county level.</p> <p>Participation and attendance to CSG needs to be binding. The existence of the CSG needs to be ratified to enhance accountability. Transactions at CSG currently border on illegalities, given that it is not a legally recognized body, whose decisions can be challenged.</p> <p>Sector technical working groups constitute the committee membership for the various CSG committees.</p>	<p><b>3.0</b></p>
<p><b>6.</b></p>	<p><b>Are government and national partners able to adapt resource allocations to hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis in support of food security and nutrition in line with changing situations and needs? (CCC5)</b></p>	<p>The resource allocation is not as flexible at the government and partner operations.</p> <p>There are limited opportunities and criteria for re-directing resources already allocated by government from one geographical location to another, bearing in mind the sensitive socio-political issues.</p>	<p><b>2.7</b></p>
<p>6.a</p>	<p>How did identified needs vary over the past five years?</p>	<p>Needs vary from time to time, as identified by assessments carried periodically. Geographical locations have also been at variance in terms of identified needs.</p> <p>Variations are affected by rainfall performance. Improved rains translate to reduction in needs of water and food, and vice versa.</p> <p>Hazards develop into disasters over time, and account for need variations over time.</p>	

6.b	How did the level of resources provided for emergency assistance in each of these years adjust to the identified needs? (i.e. the share of identified needs that was actually covered)	Resources provided did not meet all identified needs. Resource constraints consistently reported in all assistance areas. Needs were only addressed on priority basis. Approx. 50 to 60 percent of the needs identified were covered by the provided resources.  Lessons learnt on the coping mechanisms that needed to be in place for the unmet needs.	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 3:</b>			<b>2.5</b>

#### HGI 4: Programme Design and Management

No.	Question	County	
1.	Which are the stakeholders involved in the design, management and implementation of hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis ensuring compliance with national/county level policies and standards? (CCC1)	NDMA, KFSSG, UN Agencies (UNICEF, WFP, OCHA & ECHO), civil society organizations (World Vision Kenya, KRC) for drought related hazards. National Disaster Operations Centre responsible for similar roles for other hazards.  Processes to develop contingency plans are usually consultative involving a number of not-state actors.  In crafting the disaster management policy, ACTED, Action Aid, World Vision Kenya, KRC were involved in addition to County and National Government agencies. There is need to have all humanitarian actors coordinated under the leadership of the county government.	<b>3.5</b>
2.	Are hazard identification, early warning processes, and food security and vulnerability analyses carried out in accordance with clear established protocols? (CCC1)	Technical capacity of the people involved in the analysis inadequate. Some capacity development should be geared towards this area.  Ad hoc assessments are not standardized yet food security issues are assessed.  Long rains assessment and short rains assessment standard check lists and protocols.  Nutrition working group validates the document to be used in assessments, both at County and National level, hence some form of standardization.  Early warning processes and protocols is in place.  There are clear established protocols for drought related hazards and none for the other hazards.	<b>1.8</b>
3.	Do early warning alerts explicitly refer to a threat to food security/nutrition? (CCC1)	Yes- particularly for drought warnings.	<b>3.5</b>
4.	How many NDMA or county staff have been trained with respect to the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment programme? (CCC2)	3 staff from NDMA (national) 17 county & Non State actors trained	<b>1.8</b>
	To which extent have assessments improved as a result of this training?	The application is yet to be tried and the improvements are yet to be assessed/reported	
	What does the roll out plan indicate in terms of further number of staff being trained in the near future?	Sensitization of county decision-makers is underway – WIP. The county is in the very initial stages of domesticating the Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tool	
5.	Does the government at the central and county level and its national partners have the capacity to design and implement emergency preparedness and response interventions informed by an appropriate hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC2)	NDMA: The costing & budgeting ended up with blank columns while designing the Drought Contingency Plan. A comprehensive review would be required. Programme designs could tremendously improve if all sectors could be involved in the programme design.  Without explicit costings for each intervention, it is challenging for buy in by other stakeholders.  Targeting and determination of the appropriate intervention is fairly well done at the moment.  Determination of the HH vulnerability is currently undertaken by staff who may not be too sure of the process, hence making the targeting subjective rather than objective.	<b>2.0</b>

6.	<b>Is an appropriate methodology in place for carrying out hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analyses, including for nutrition, in emergency settings? If yes, please provide specifics here and for below sub-questions. (CCC2)</b>	The nutrition unit is supported by the National Nutrition unit for methodologies, tools and skills to carry out analyses.	<b>2.5</b>
6.a	Are tools in place for conducting hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analyses, including for nutrition?	Yes	
	Is gender-sensitivity factored into the food security and vulnerability analysis?	Yes: Data for nutrition is gender disaggregated to reflect the vulnerability along gender lines.  Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tool also facilitates pick up of gender data. Deliberate efforts are in place thru focused group discussion to pick the gender dimensions to food security.	
6.b	Does the system entail analysis exercises for different types of emergencies?	No, only drought emergencies are analysed.	
	Are there other types of disasters than drought to which the county is prone? If yes, which ones?	Yes: floods, landslides, insecurity, snake bites.	
6.c	Is data collection done through a representative sampling of the population?	Yes: For assessments and surveys sampling is representative.  Sample sites are distributed according to livelihood activities. Info obtained can be extrapolated to represent the population in that livelihood zone. (drought related hazards only)	
6.d	Does data processing include the use of a data quality control systems?	Yes, for drought & nutrition, no for other disasters- no.	
6.e	Is data analysis carried out by a required multidisciplinary range of experts?	Yes: data collection multi-disciplinary while monitoring is centred at the drought info desk	
	For the food security and vulnerability analyses, is information disaggregated for men and women?	No: Deliberate attempts are made at the points of intervention to disaggregate data.	
6.f	In the past, how accurate have hazard analysis, early warning systems, and food security and vulnerability analyses been? Are there adequate M&E systems in place?	Log frame derived from the NDMA strategic plan. An M&E unit is being established at the National level.  For drought monitoring, the data and subsequent analysis has been accurate.  M&E systems are in place, in conjunction with the Meteorology Department. Log frame derived from the NDMA strategic plan. A M&E unit is being established at the National level  PSP systems try to check community reactions to available information.	
	What challenges have been faced?	Information sharing and appropriate action on the information is still a challenge.  The early warning bulletin is shared but interpreted differently by the community. Late response by the community is still notable.  Community feedback meetings should give information on the degree to which early warning information informs response activities.  Flags were up early this year, and it remains to be seen how fast the communities activate their coping mechanisms.	

	Which measures are being proposed to improve current analyses?	<p>Increase in the number sentinel sites being monitored to improve the geographical coverage and sample size, sustainability.</p> <p>New approaches, Kenya Initial Rapid Assessment tool and capacity development thereon.</p> <p>Identification of incentives to encourage communities to activate coping strategies in time.</p> <p>Green/Yellow &amp; Red flags... to avoid emergency offtakes.</p> <p>Avail resources to support systems for commercial offtakes as opposed to emergency offtakes.</p> <p>Sensitization/capacity development of the community on drought phases, by use of indigenous knowledge and appropriate technology.</p> <p>Encourage irrigation agriculture in the drought prone areas.</p> <p>Need to have community gatekeepers, elders, administrators, etc. their engagement in communication of early warning information to communities may yield positive results.</p> <p>Community education to be enhanced on sustainability of community owned food security projects. Current and modern agriculture techniques and ways.</p> <p>Programme designs need rethinking such that tangible results can be reported with time. There is likelihood that a number of programmes being implemented perpetuate dependence on interventions.</p> <p>Involvement of communities in planning of decisions is essential, so as to enhance community ownership of the programmes, and guarantee sustainability thereafter.</p> <p>The decentralization of governance structures is an opportunity to get things right. For 50years of independence, the present day county only had 4 ambulances, in 2 years of devolution, 24 have been acquired. The rate of development has been accelerated as a result of devolution. Devolution is a grand opportunity to address the emergency issues in a more sustainable way.</p>	
7.	<b>Do present methodologies for hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis include effective multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms at national and county level, which encompass players and actions related to addressing food assistance needs? (CCC3)</b>	Yes: Methodologies are in place, particularly for drought. There is room for improvement.	<b>2.8</b>
7.a	Is there a coordination mechanism in place to facilitate the enhancement of information collection, analysis, forecasting and scenario building, quality assurance and sharing/dissemination?	Yes: Need to create a policy framework for the CSG to enhance coordination.	
7.b	Are effective partnerships for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and resource mobilization established for interventions ensuring hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis under government leadership?	Yes: impartial engagements to ensure the best outcomes are realized at community level are areas to be interrogated. Need to bring in other hazards.	
8.	<b>Are the methodologies for hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability assessment designed to ensure coherence across the nation, yet flexible enough to adapt to local needs, i.e. do procedures foresee a structured way in which methodologies can differ and local differences be taken into account, without jeopardising the nationwide validity of results? (CCC4)</b>	<p>County contexts vary from one to the other. The methodologies take this into account.</p> <p>There is constant engagement between the two levels of government with a view to domesticating the national policies to specific county contexts.</p> <p>Social audits need to be conducted to establish the effect of various interventions by humanitarian actors. The capacity should be built such that emergency preparedness and response &amp; disaster risk reduction activities can be carried out as a standard procedure or part of the programme design.</p> <p>Single pipeline programming needs to be strengthened such as to increase the efficiency of the assistance programmes.</p> <p>Last mile details can be picked and registered online on the LMMS system, like one currently used by World Vision Kenya.</p> <p>A manual system currently exists at the county government, there is need to build on the system and possibly upgrade to an online based system.</p> <p>Sustainability into the production safety nets to progress beneficiaries to food secure households.</p> <p>Cash Transfer interventions can be implemented to even to places where accessibility is a challenge. Markets analysis needs to precede the CT interventions. Information sharing can influence demand and supply forces in the markets.</p>	<b>3.0</b>

<b>9.</b>	<b>Does the present system of hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis have the capacity to adapt to changing requirements? E.g. how does the system react to potential sudden crises? How does it accommodate the entry or exit of national or international partners? (CCC5)</b>	Yes: The system has the capacity to adapt, but needs to be supported with a gradual changeover. The CSG organ can accommodate the exit plans for any of the partners.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 4:</b>			<b>2.8</b>

### HGI 5: Continuity and Sustained National Capacity/Civil Society Voice

No.	Question		
<b>1.</b>	<b>Does the national government have a long-term strategy or vision for the system of hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC1)</b>	The country CPP is quite elaborate on the vision and strategy. National Disaster Management Authority being mooted to enhance DM	<b>3.5</b>
	Does this strategy or vision have tangible effects at county level?	Chapter 13 of the CIDP- Baringo County.  Drought resilience programmes are currently ongoing in the county.  Irrigation agriculture is being scaled up to address food insecurity with 300,000 acres set to be under irrigation within the next 5yrs.  There is a clear road map, and most of the activities feature in departmental operational plans... all emanating from the CIDP.  Efforts at the moment are all geared towards drought management, drought disasters accounting for the bulk of disaster risks within the county.	
	Does it include any major change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors, and between central and sub-national levels of government?	EDE envisages that the government takes the lead while all other actors support.  WFP, JICA among other non-state actors are involved in various activities related to ending drought.	
<b>2.</b>	<b>Are the civil society, communities and the private sector at the central and county levels committed to addressing the needs of affected groups? (CCC1)</b>	Communities, faith based organizations and private sector are committed to addressing the needs of affected groups.  The Civil society plays different roles that are project based. Their commitments therefore are at times unsustainable. A number of civil society organizations run their own show, the situation should be such that they only complement government efforts to ensure sustainability of projects.  Catholic Relief Services actively involved in various activities. The level of involvement from begin to end of an emergency is not structured. Some faith based organizations move with speed to respond to emergencies in an uncoordinated fashion, resulting in some duplications and wastage of resources.	<b>2.5</b>
	Are these commitments tailored in a sustainable way?	Yes: some of it is sustainable, in particular for faith-based organizations, while the private sector commitments are largely unsustainable.	
	Has there been a substantive engagement of civil society in hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis in the past five years?		




3.	<b>Is national funding stable and are resources available for future hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis? (CCC2)</b>	<p>Budgets approved by the County assemblies are stable.</p> <p>The adequacy of the available funding is doubtful both at National and County level.</p> <p>NDMA relies on donor funding various activities, Drought Contingency Fund is purely a donor initiative and its growth depends on the prudent management and the commitment by government to honour its portion of the contribution. Other disasters managed by the special programmes directorate access funding from the national treasury. Government commitment in terms of funding anti-drought activities is key and essential in the effort to ending droughts. Donor funding may not be sustainable or guaranteed for the future.</p> <p>Dept. of Agriculture is currently engaged in developing drought resistant varieties of various crops to improve food security at household level.</p> <p>In the Dept. of Health emergency response has largely been donor &amp; CSO supported in the past. Need to mainstream activities in budgets for government to fund.</p> <p>Boreholes currently being done by the water department. Maintenance of the boreholes is a challenge at the moment. Spring protection programmes are running in mixed farming livelihood zones, and they are proving sustainable.</p> <p>Water harvesting from school roofs, but the amount harvested is usually insufficient to take the schools through the three months of dry spell. Water trucking complements the water harvesting.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
3.a	What has been the level of resources for these activities in the past five years?	Approx. KES 2 million in the past 2 years. Certain crucial activities have been left out due to insufficient funding.	
3.b	What has been the share of resource requirements that has been covered in the past five years?	Approx. 70 percent. Activities need to be mainstreamed into departmental plans including funding for the activities.	
3.c	What has been the share of resources mobilized by national and county governments for these activities in the past five years?	100 percent of the resources availed by the government agencies. The county has no express allocations for preparedness activities.	
3.d	What are the prospects for each of these questions in the medium-term future?	Additional resource mobilization are planned for the future.	
4.	<b>Are there systems and resources available for civil society, communities, and private sector's participation in the development and management of policy and programmes addressing needs of target groups, and for monitoring and feedback at the national and county levels? (CCC2)</b>	<p>Yes, there are systems, in particular the CSG.</p> <p>Resources are inadequate.</p> <p>CSG meetings diminished at the end of a project that required the discussion of the drought management bulleting at the CSG. There have been very few meetings since the end of the project.</p> <p>The County should strengthen the coordination mechanism as the CSG by legalizing its existence.</p>	
	Are these systems and resources sustainable?	Resource availability is unsustainable.	
5.	<b>Does government lead the present system of hazard analysis, early warning and, food security and vulnerability analysis? How? (CCC3)</b>	The government takes lead through NDMA.	<b>3.0</b>
	Does the present system rest on a secure (multiple-sourced) basis of resources, and are back-up plans in place, or does it depend on the goodwill of one or few external partners?	The multi-stakeholder arrangement secures the resource base for systems emergency preparedness and response.	
6.	<b>Are mobilized resources and partnerships sustainable to plan, design and implement necessary activities? (CCC3)</b>	Resources mobilized are insufficient for necessary activities.	<b>2.0</b>

7.	<p><b>Are civil society, communities and private sector actively contributing resources (CCC3)</b></p> <p>Are they engaged in designing and implementing activities addressing the needs of vulnerable groups?</p>	<p>Communities &amp; private sector organizations actively involved in preparedness activities.</p> <p>Programme designs done by professionals, but data and input is sourced from the communities. The community capacity to design programmes is not as developed</p>	<b>3.0</b>
8.	<p><b>How is the information and analysis stored and accessed, (CCC4)?</b></p> <p>Is it available to government, the public and the international community (where appropriate)?</p>	<p>NDMA documents and reports are stored online, and can be accessed therefrom. Hard copies can be requested from both NDMA and County government.</p> <p>Capacity enhancement towards the development of an information system is required to facilitate efficient communication.</p> <p>Drought monitoring mailing list is available for information sharing to all stakeholders at community and international community. The info is usually shared on the site. Drought response activities uploaded into the MIS each evening for all activities done at any given time. Storage and retrieval.</p> <p>Arid and semi-arid land stakeholder forum mapping tool, if adopted can enhance info sharing and communication within the humanitarian community working in arid and semi-arid areas.</p> <p>The county maintains information manually in a filing system. The information is readily available to all stakeholders.</p> <p>The info is not classified, and available on request.</p> <p>Reports for all interventions must be shared at the end of the programmes. Systems need to be improved for the County so that the information can be accessible electronically.</p>	<b>3.0</b>
8.a	<p>Are the results of hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis disseminated to the relevant authorities?</p>	<p>Yes</p>	
8.b	<p>Are the results of hazard analysis, early warning, and food security and vulnerability analysis disseminated to the general public?</p>	<p>Yes: for the county government thru the civic education programmes. Public participation programmes also enhance dissemination to the general public. Quarterly newsletters are issued by the communications department covering all activities related to emergency preparedness and response &amp; DM.</p> <p>NDMA does not disseminate the information to the general public, but is available on request by any interested member of the public.</p> <p>Challenges reported include coverage and communication modes, which may not reach the wider public. ICT technology needs to be harnessed to facilitate more effective communications. Feedback mechanism to be incorporated into the planning.</p>	
9.	<p><b>Has a flexible and strategic approach to work with the civil society, the communities and the private sector been developed to ensure their consistent participation and engagement in hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis? (CCC4)</b></p> <p>Are these approaches sustainable?</p>	<p>The Civil society, community and private sector has been engaged flexibly through the CSG. The capacity to engage effectively at the CSG needs to be assessed and strengthened. Role definitions and responsibilities needs to be looked into. The coordination organ should be structured and formalized with clear visions, missions and goals.</p> <p>Yes: the sustainability needs to be guaranteed by strengthening the legal framework within which the organ operates, with clear mandate, roles and responsibilities for all members.</p>	<b>3.5</b>



10.	<b>How is hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis performance being monitored? (CCC5)</b>	Monitoring is done by presentation of the reports at the CSG.	<b>2.0</b>
	Are challenges/potential failures of the system identified	<p>It is not clear how the funding for the CSG is going to be carried out going forward and the opportunities to interrogate the reports and monitor is likely to be lost.</p> <p>Key sectors whose input is reflected in the bulletin do not have the opportunity to contribute to the draft reports before the final copy is circulated. Findings from drought bulletins inform a number of programming decisions and the timelines can be stringent to the point of some feedback not availed in time may be left out</p>	
	Are the challenges discussed and lessons learned used to improve the system? Please provide examples	<p>The presentation of the bulletin has improved over time, principally because of the lessons learnt and discussions of the challenges.</p> <p>Data capture enumerators need to be refreshed and capacity built so as to enhance the quality of the data collected.</p>	
11.	<b>How does the present system of hazard analysis, early warning and vulnerability analysis address changing situations? E.g. ad hoc needs, additional geographic areas, sudden events, changing partners? Is this system sustainable, or does it depend on chance/extraordinary circumstances? (CCC5)</b>	<p>Present system is sustainable, but not flexible enough to address changing situations. Most livelihood zones have changed over time from pastoral to agro-pastoral yet reclassifications and review have not been done. Realities on ground are therefore missed, compromising on intervention decisions and emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>The system needs to be improved so as to have update data at any given time. The current status is that extended time is required to retrieve the data.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
12.	<b>Do the civil society, communities and the private sector contribute to the county's learning and to incorporating lessons learned and good practices to sustain adequate emergency preparedness and response activities for vulnerable groups? (CCC5)</b>	<p>There is effort by the stakeholders, but much more is required to enhance learning and improvement of emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>Feedback mechanisms need to be strengthened so as to inform future programming of emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>More civic education needs to be carried out in order to get community engagement and feedback related to emergency preparedness and response. More learning events and sensitization needs to be organized on various aspects of the projects.</p>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 5:</b>			<b>2.8</b>



# ANNEX 3: BARINGO CAPACITY GAPS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AREA 2

## Humanitarian Supply Chain Management

<b>HGI 1: Policy and Legislative Environment</b>			
<b>NO</b>	<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>COUNTY</b>	
1.	Is the importance of humanitarian supply chain (HSC) management reflected in national policies, strategies, laws etc.? (CCC1)	HSC management is reflected in a number of policies and strategies of the County such as:  Disaster management regulations and policy, Emergency Fund Act and the CIDP.  Relief food distribution guidelines are in place.  The last mile details are not adequately featured in the policy frameworks. There is need to for instruments to be created to strengthen coordination in terms of how the CSG will be supported, its roles and responsibilities.	<b>2.5</b>
1.a	Which are they? – list relevant instruments from constitution to national development plans, policies, strategies, etc. as applicable	The relevant instruments include: the CIDP, The County Nutrition Action plan, the emergency fund Act, and Drought Contingency plan.	
1.b	Are these instruments up to date, e.g. do they adequately reflect the changing environment due to devolved government?	The CIDP is currently undergoing review, while the Contingency Plan is yet to be reviewed.	
2.	Are there contingency (or other) plans in place at national and sub-national level) that include provisions to ensure adequate and timely HSC management? (CCC1)	A Drought Contingency Plan is in place, though it has not been entirely adopted by the County Assembly.  The contingency plan elaborates roles and responsibilities of different actors within the county government, in handling emergencies such that adequate and timely emergency response is ensured.	<b>2.8</b>
3.	Are relevant instruments supported by adequate legislation and regulations, and translated into action plans with clear responsibilities, results frameworks and timelines? (CCC2)	The DCP clearly spells out the responsibilities for each stakeholder, the extent of clarity may not be confirmed. The County assembly is yet to adopt the CP.	
4.	Are the relevant instruments being implemented? State for each identified instrument. (CCC2)	The implementation process is ongoing for the various instruments, with varying degrees of progress so far achieved. Resource constraints have impeded timely and efficient implementation of a number of programmes foreseen by the CIDP some progress have been made. The realization that some instruments did not adequately capture some issues has also been identified in the course of implementation thus triggering some review processes being mooted for the CIDP and the contingency plans.	<b>2.5</b>
5.	When devising instruments related to HSC management, has government established partnerships with relevant key stakeholders (UN, civil society, private sector, research institutes, other governments, etc.), specifically with those players that have a direct role in supporting or contributing to HSC management? (CCC3)	NDMA, KRC, ACTED and a number of private sector organizations, FBOs and CBOs are actively engaged in the process to develop instruments for emergency response.	<b>3.5</b>
6.	Do national and county development plans, and other instruments supporting HSC management establish links to other relevant instruments and programmes to establish increased stability and reliability? (CCC4)	Chapter 7 of the CIDP extensively describes the linkages with other national instruments such as Kenya Vision 2030 MTP2, the Constitution of Kenya Millenniums Development Goals, Public Finance Management Act 2012 and other legislative pieces. There is need to update it to reflect new changes in the global arena in the area of Disaster Risk Reduction, such as the ratification of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals.	<b>2.7</b>

6.a	Do different systems and mechanisms differ in different regions without compromising overall standards and reliability?	The mechanisms of intervention exhibit some consistency from one region to another with slight contextualization.	
<b>7.</b>	<b>Do relevant instruments foresee the involvement of communities in HSC management? (CCC4)</b>	The communities avail information and participate in a number of activities... loading and off-loading of relief supplies, food for work to open up feeder roads etc. The community is regarded as first responders with all the challenges they have. Some capacity building needs to be done to ensure the community response is useful. Sharing of rations at community level noted. Feedback and complaints mechanism is not fully structured... feedback received is informal. The quality and validity of the information received is not always easy to determine. There are no standard procedures for specific actions to be taken. Feedback on suitability of the interventions is also received within the programme design, there is need to have an in built mechanism to have social audits of the programmes implemented.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>8.</b>	<b>Are the relevant national and sub-national instruments supporting HSC management responsive to changing situations and needs? (CCC5).</b>	Regulations on management of emergencies exist. The policy provides for responses to be conducted and for the reports and reviews to be done much later. Flexibility at the programme design level needs to be incorporated.	<b>2.5</b>
8.a	How has emergency assistance been provided in recent years?	The county government has partnered with a number of stakeholders to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches vulnerable need in the event of a disaster. Additional assistance has been provided by the Special Programmes Directorate of the National Government.	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 1:</b>			<b>2.8</b>

## HGI 2: Effective and Accountable Institutions

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
<b>1.</b>	<b>Is there a designated lead institution within the national and / or county government with clearly defined role and responsibility with respect to HSC management? (CCC1)</b>	There is presently no designate institution to lead emergency response from the County. This notwithstanding, the County is in the process of establishing a Disaster Management Unit which is foreseen to be the lead institution in emergency response. A budgetary provision has been set aside in the FY 2015/16 budget for its operationalization.  To date, the CSG has been the lead organ to coordinate emergency response thru a relevant committee.	<b>2.0</b>
1.a	Which institution? If there are several institutions (e.g. central and county-level), how do their mandates complement, overlap, or contradict each other?	A number of institutions engaged in emergency response activities include:  KRC, World Vision Kenya, WFP and others. Due to the weak coordination structure, some emergency response efforts overlap hence resulting in some inefficiency. Some areas of the County miss out on any form of assistance while other areas receive proportionately more assistance resulting from the overlapping mandates.  Some agencies such as ACTED are preparedness oriented while others are emergency response oriented, providing good complementation for each other.	
1.b	Do the mandates of relevant institutions ensure that HSC management can adequately reach all people vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition? Are there gaps between institutional mandates? Which?	Yes, the CSG as a coordinating body strives to ensure that all vulnerable people are reached by humanitarian assistance. Gaps could be addressed by strengthening the CSG roles.	
<b>2.</b>	<b>Are the roles/responsibilities of the different stakeholders and administrative levels (sub-national and national) clearly defined for the function? (CCC2)</b>	The roles and responsibilities of various are clearly defined.	<b>3.0</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>Are all relevant food assistance and nutrition stakeholders aware of their roles and responsibilities with respect to HSC management? (CCC2)</b>	Stakeholder awareness is high among the various actors in Nutrition and Food assistance. There is need to harness the activities of each stakeholder under the leadership of the county government to realize a more coordinated approach to emergency response.	<b>2.5</b>

4.	<b>Do relevant institutions involved in HSC management have the systems, processes and resources (e.g. in terms of staff, knowledge, guidelines/procedures and equipment) to work in an efficient and accountable manner? Provide answers for each relevant institution; e.g. is there sufficient staff, and does relevant staff have sufficient knowledge and skills to ensure adequate and timely HC management? (CCC2)</b>	The county government is still forming up, having been in place for the past two years. Staffing in key emergency preparedness and response institutions remains a challenge being addressed on an ongoing basis. The Disaster Management Unit is due to be established, and the systems and equipment will be deployed thereafter.  NDMA on the other hand has been in existence since 2011, having even pre-existed as an Arid Lands Resource Management Project hitherto. NDMA therefore has the staff and the systems necessary for effective preparedness, though financial resources remain a limiting factor to its efficient operations. Specific technical skills are also lacking and the existing workforce needs capacity development in the areas of data collection and analysis.	<b>2.2</b>
4.a	Answer for each relevant institution – when discussing if systems, process and resources are sufficient, use the test question if HSC management in recent years has in fact been provided in an adequate and timely manner– and if not, why.		
4.b	How does the day-to-day work of HSC management function? Are there any bottlenecks? What could be the underlying reasons for these?	Activities are weighted more towards emergency response than preparedness and risk management. Day today work revolves around review of information available on hazards and early warning. Consistently, updates are shared on the risk factors and hazards. Resource mobilization is also ongoing on a day to day basis.	
5.	<b>Do comprehensive and effective multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder coordination mechanisms exist at national and county level with respect to HSC management? (CCC3)</b>	CSG acts at the county level, co-chaired by the Governor and the County Commissioner. The organ is responsible to approve budgets for response, and receive reports on planned and ongoing disaster risk reduction activities. Requests for interventions are channelled through the CSG for discussion and technical input. Minutes for the CSG are mandatory for access to the Drought Contingency Fund.  The CSG brings together all county level stakeholders and membership is flexible to accommodate membership from all humanitarian actors.	<b>2.7</b>
6.	<b>Are there accountability lines and functional coordination mechanisms across government stakeholders at different levels (national/county/community level) to ensure that humanitarian supplies actually reach the people that should be covered by emergency assistance? (CCC4)</b>	The CSG came into place in the Arid Lands Resource management project days and was adopted by the new governance structure. A review of the terms of reference should be done in order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of responses	<b>2.7</b>
7.	<b>Are relevant institutions able to manage risk and to learn and adapt depending on changing situations and needs in order to ensure that humanitarian supplies reach the people in need of emergency assistance in an efficient and consistent manner? (CCC5)</b>	Different risk management strategies have been adopted by different institutions based on policies, rules and legislation. To a large extent this has ensured that emergency assistance reached the people in need. There is need to develop standard operating procedures, and guidelines for emergency response at the County level to manage more risks.  Learning and knowledge management also needs to be re-looked as the current mechanisms do not offer ample learning opportunities to inform programme adjustments to changing situations and needs.	<b>2.1</b>
7.a	Are there examples where adaption to changing needs worked – or did not work?	Rigidity in the systems and programme designs hamper and limit adaptation and flexibility.	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 2:</b>			<b>2.4</b>

**HGI 3: Programme Financing and Strategic Planning**

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	<b>Does government at central and county level and national partners have committed funding for HSC management? (CCC1)</b>	<p>The County government has committed funding though inadequate. KES 80 million has been set aside in FY 2015/16 for emergency response.</p> <p>The fund is based on an explicit provision of the Public Financial Management Act (PFM)</p>	<b>2.5</b>
1.a	I.e. is there an established budget line for the function at national and sub-national level?	<p>It is a revolving fund in essence that should be replenished. The use of the funds is situation specific it being a reactionary fund.</p> <p>The Drought Contingency plan has the budgets for various sub-sectors.</p>	
1.b	Is there a sufficient contingency of financial resources and assets to ensure adequate HSC management in an emergency? Or does the level of resources for each new emergency depend on new resource mobilization efforts?	<p>The resources are ordinarily not adequate to cover all requirements in specific emergency. The contingency plan is used for resource mobilization for each new emergency. The DCP has not been formally adopted by the county government</p> <p>In the FY 2014/15 more support had to be sought from the Ministry of Special Programmes being that the 2 percent was already exhausted.</p> <p>In all drought scenarios, NDMA prepares drought response plans which are partly funded by Drought Contingency Fund at the NDMA headquarters.</p>	
2.	<b>Does the government have sufficient material resources (financial, institutional) to ensure adequate and timely HSC management? (I.e. is the available budget sufficient for the required action?) (CCC2)</b>	<p>Only 2 percent (a provision of the Public Financial Management Act) of the County's budget is set aside for emergency response- an amount grossly inadequate for emergency response, considering the multiple hazards and the response activities.</p> <p>The county relies almost entirely on the disbursements from the National Treasury. In case of delays in disbursement, emergency response activities can be significantly hampered.</p> <p>Rapid assessments are carried to which determine the kind of response required from the national government or international community.</p> <p>Among the humanitarian agencies working in the County, project based funds available on need basis, for emergency response.</p> <p>Specific requests based on magnitudes of disasters are made to the National government for purposes or response. There is however no clear policy or guidelines as to the thresholds that determine escalation to the National Government.</p> <p>The Drought Contingency Fund is set aside specifically for drought related hazards. Drought Contingency Fund is sufficient and most counties were able to access funds based on requests. Disaster risk reduction is well taken care of at the moment.</p>	<b>2.5</b>
3.	<b>In an emergency, can financial resources and assets be accessed rapidly to purchase and mobilize food assistance? (CCC2)</b>	Emergency funds can be rapidly accessed for the purchase of relief assistance commodities. However, the fund is inadequate to meet typical needs in an emergency response, compromising the effectiveness of the overall emergency response activity.	<b>2.5</b>
4.	<b>Does the government and its national partners have the capacity to efficiently manage financial resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and accountable HSC management? (CCC2)</b>	The government has the systems and structures to efficiently manage financial resources in an emergency response. Most financial transactions are handled thru the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) which has significantly enhanced efficiency in financial management	
5.	<b>Does the government have the capacity to coordinate and engage with partners to diversify sources of funding or other assistance for HSC management? (CCC3)</b>	The county government thru the CSG structure is engaging with partners and coordinating resource mobilization for emergency response activities. The stakeholders play active roles at the County in emergency preparedness and response areas.	<b>2.5</b>
5.a	How was the HSC management of the past five years funded? (mix of contributors)	In the two years the County has been in place, the County has funded part of the emergency response budget while the balance has been funded by other development partners and NDMA's Drought Contingency Fund	

6.	<b>Do established procedures for resource mobilization and funding allocation ensure consistency of HSC management across geographical areas and interventions, yet are flexible enough to adapt to specific needs? (CCC4)</b>	Emergency response is timely to some extent, thanks to early warnings received from NDMA. Response to other kinds of disasters other than drought depends on the speed with which the CSG mobilizes resources and rolls out interventions. There is flexibility in adapting to specific needs, though to a limited extent. This is occasioned by the nature of budgeting processes in place and donor regulations tied to certain funding which compel implementing partners to carry out specific activities with very little room for flexibility.	<b>2.0</b>
7.	<b>Are government, and national partners able to adapt resource allocations to HSC management in line with changing situations and needs? (CCC5)</b>	The CSG is the ultimate decision making body in the allocation of resources to any emergency response intervention. Re-allocation of resources based on changed situations and needs is limited especially when they have been committed to specific activities in a given geographical area. There are sensitive socio-political considerations to be balanced before resource reallocation.	<b>2.7</b>
7.a	How did identified needs vary over the past five years?	Needs vary from time to time, as identified by assessments carried periodically. Geographical locations have also been at variance in terms of identified needs.  Variations are affected by rainfall performance. Improved rains translate to reduction in needs of water and food, and vice versa.  Hazards develop into disasters over time, and account for need variations when not mitigation and early interventions are not put in place.	
7.b	How did the level of resources provided for emergency assistance in each of these years adjust to the identified needs? (i.e. the share of identified needs that was actually covered)	Resources provided did not meet all identified needs. Resource constraints consistently reported in all assistance areas. Needs were only addressed on priority basis. Approx. 50 to 60 percent of the needs identified were covered by the provided resources.  Lessons learnt on the coping mechanisms that needed to be in place for the unmet needs.	
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 3:</b>			<b>2.4</b>

#### HGI 4: Programme Design and Management

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	
1.	<b>Are the stakeholders involved in HSC management ensuring compliance with national policies and standards? (CCC1)</b>		<b>2.0</b>
1.a	Are there clear national protocols on how to provide humanitarian supplies, including public procurement and accountability standards, and are they being adhered to be HSC management?	No set standard operating procedures, lots of borrowing from nationally accepted standards.  The capacity to produce coherent standard operating procedures is inadequate, both at the County Level and within NDMA. Special Programmes (guidelines & policies) have been cascaded from the National government as well as the PPA (e-procurement guidelines) and accountability.  Standard business process is available for accessing Drought Contingency Fund, including the accountability reporting. These are all online.	
1.b	Is there a flexible import protocol in place that enables the efficient importation of humanitarian goods?	No import protocol in place at the county. National Treasury responsible for tax waivers relating to humanitarian imports.  Direct purchases from the National Cereals and Produce Board are allowed. Various challenges experienced with these purchases such as terms of payment and delivery. Government has severally opted to contract suppliers to deliver the required commodities	
1.c	Are there procurement practices for food, special nutrition products and NFI in place?	In the event of flooding, fires, wind etc., non-food items are usually procured. Liaison with KRC in many instances, as a lead agency in responding sudden onset disasters.  Guidelines and specifications for special and highly nutritious foods need to be developed.	





2.	<b>Does the government and its national partners have the capacity for adequate HSC management that ensures that planned emergency assistance actually reaches the population identified as being in need? (CCC2)</b>	The HSC capacity to deliver exists though at a fairly basic level.	<b>2.5</b>
2.a	Is there a rapid food procurement process in place that still ensures accountability?	Yes- the public procurement act is enforced in all types of procurements.	
2.b	Is there sufficient storage capacity in adequate quality?	<p>No, The Chief offices to which commodities are currently delivered do not have adequate storage capacity for the handling and management of stocks.</p> <p>Storage facilities at Sub-County particularly for highly nutritious foods should be developed to facilitate pre-positioning of the supplies. s. A budget of KES 3M has been set aside to develop a storage facility. The legislation may limit the development of the unit since storage is not contemplated as part of the response.</p> <p>There are a number of National Cereals and Produce boards within the County.</p> <p>The National Cereals and Produce Board has several depots in the County which can be leased out to the County- this option should be considered in the short run to access good quality storage facilities while planning constructions in the long run.</p>	
2.c	Does the existing transport infrastructure (paved roads and density of the road network) enable reliable access to crises prone areas at any time?	Most places are accessible- food delivered to the chief's office from which point the beneficiaries make their own arrangements to get their rations home. Access to a number of places in the rugged terrains can be very challenging esp. during the rainy seasons.	
2.d	Can the contracted transport vehicles access difficult terrains?	<p>Many areas accessible to light vehicles, four-wheel drive etc. a number of locations are not accessible to loaded vehicles carrying relief commodities.</p> <p>The county is in the process of purchasing a canter truck. There is also a plan to acquire some light 4-wheel drive vehicles for rapid response to small scale emergencies.</p>	
3.	<b>Are methodologies in place that ensure adequate, timely and accountable HSC management? (CCC2)</b>	<p>Methodologies in place to ensure timely and accountable response, but timeliness of interventions is still a challenge, partly because of inadequate resources, and partly due the missing emergency response standard operating procedures.</p> <p>Accountability is supported by the systems Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), besides the usual accounting procedures supported by vouchers.</p>	<b>2.2</b>
4.	<b>Are effective partnerships for HSC management established (CCC3)</b>	Partnerships are in place for emergency response. Though no formal MoUs signed with respect to emergency preparedness and response activities for the various partners active in this area, the partners play a significant role as acknowledged by the technical team.	<b>2.5</b>
4.a	Which partners are involved, and how?	Partners involved in emergency preparedness and response activities in the county include KRC (emergency response) World Vision (Resilience building) WFP (emergency preparedness and response & Resilience) and ACTED (early warning) among others.	
5.	<b>Is the design and implementation of HSC management coherent nationwide and are there implementation procedures and mechanisms in place to ensure consistency of service delivery and monitoring activities, yet flexible enough to adapt to local needs? (CCC4)</b>	<p>The design and implementation of various interventions is relatively variable at nationwide as there are no uniform standards thereof.</p> <p>The CSG remains accountable for services delivered hence ensuring some quality of service delivery, including adaptation to peculiar needs</p>	<b>1.5</b>
5.a	Are technological applications in place for planning and managing humanitarian assistance?	It is anticipated that with the set-up of the Disaster Management Unit, technological applications will be procured within the current Financial Year. Budget lines have been created, and stakeholders have been identified. Volunteers from KRC have also been identified who will assist in jumpstarting the process. The idea is conceptual at the moment, and should be actualized in due course. Disaster response is currently unstructured, more needs to be done.	

5.b	Does the present system for HSC management use one standard methodology, or does the system foresee various models according to geographic areas, market conditions and other circumstances?	The focus at the moment seems to be on a standard food and NFI response methodology. Various modelling experience and systems development need to be done for alternative intervention modalities other than cash.	
6.	<b>Do HSC management procedures and structures have mechanisms in place to assess and adapt to lessons learned and changing situations and are these used effectively? E.g. do they foresee assessments of e.g. market conditions as a precondition to apply different modalities of emergency assistance, including cash? (CCC5)</b>	<p>Documentation of responses happens after occurrences of emergencies. Press releases have been done in the past to alert vulnerable people with information and warnings.</p> <p>NDMA provides opportunities for feedback from beneficiaries. A slaughter de-stocking was arranged to assist the vulnerable elderly people, only for feedback to be returned that the elderly persons could not eat the meat, they needed the softer food such as rice &amp; beans. Cash interventions could have been more appropriate for such an occasion.</p> <p>Lesson sharing forums are arranged as part of each response plan. Feedback sharing and lessons learnt are discussed with all stakeholders.</p>	<b>3.5</b>
7.	<b>Does the Government have sufficient contingency of means of transport or are rapid activation agreements in place for contracted transportation services in time of rapidly increasing needs? (CCC5)</b>	<p>The county has 4 trucks currently used for construction purposes. On need basis, contracting process are activated, but there are no stand-by rapid activation contracts. The water department has an additional truck for water trucking stationed in various sub-counties.</p> <p>NDMA has 1 water boozer for specialized responses and operational continuity in stressed schools and health facilities. At both National and County Level, NDMA has pre-qualified transporters who can be contracted to offer transport services when required. There is need to create additional capacity for rapid interventions by exploring stand-by/ rapid activation contracts for emergency response.</p> <p>Transporters are sourced locally, within the county. There are no known restrictions to engagement of transporters outside the county. Transport capacity within the county has largely been sufficient. For bulk purchases of commodities, the procurement processes are largely national, such that the national government procures and delivers to the County. Secondary transport is arranged therefrom</p> <p>The National Youth Service is available to offer transport and logistics services at agreed rates. The S service is well equipped with various categories of trucks, vehicles and heavy earthmoving equipment for road construction. With funding availability, transport contracting is generally efficient. For the road terrains that are fairly challenging to private transporters, Government vehicles are used. Better transport rates can be negotiated in the course of emergency preparedness and response so as to manage costs which may escalate in an emergency scenario. The systems need to be integrated and streamlined for better response.</p> <p>The capacity of government needs to be built such that the Government can take lead in response activities. The ultimate responsibility to respond rests with the county government.</p> <p>A LCA to be scheduled to determine the capacity of the available transport services.</p> <p>The capacity for local rapid response also needs to be considered. The capacity for borehole maintenance services can be developed.</p>	<b>3.0</b>
8.	<b>In case of complete failure of road transport, is there alternative transport in place to reach affected areas (e.g. through waterways, air)? (CCC5)</b>	<p>Donkeys were used to limited extent to ferry commodities to some places which are not accessible by any means.</p> <p>Motor boats are used in the lake Baringo area and are generally available. Where distances to be covered are large and quantities involved are large, other options including longer alternative routes are used. The Donkeys are not primarily used as beasts of burden. Communities need to be sensitized on the use of camels, donkeys, motor bikes and bicycles.</p>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 4:</b>			<b>2.2</b>

**HGI 5: Continuity and Sustained National Capacity/Civil Society Voice**

NO	QUESTION	COUNTY	SCORE
1.	Does the government have a long-term strategy or vision for sustaining and ensuring HSC management in the future? Does this vision include any major change of responsibilities between government and non-governmental actors, and between central and sub-national levels of government? (CCC1)	<p>Though there exists a vision and long term strategy at the National Level for emergency response, there is no clear strategy at the County Level for emergency response.</p> <p>The ongoing discussion around the establishment of a Disaster Management Unit will firmly ground emergency preparedness and response activities and facilitate the discussion of sustainability strategies.</p> <p>Chapter 6 of the CIDP mentions that the County shall establish a Disaster Contingency Fund for rapid response to Disasters.</p>	2.5
2.	Do civil society, communities and the private sector at the central and county levels have a role in HSC management, and do they contribute to it? (CCC1)	<p>Communities, faith based organizations and private sector are committed to addressing the needs of affected groups.</p> <p>The Civil society plays different roles that are project based. Their commitments therefore are at times unsustainable. A number of civil society organizations run their own show, the situation should be such that they only complement government efforts to ensure sustainability of projects.</p>	2.5
3.	Is national funding stable and are resources available for adequate HSC management? (CCC2)	<p>Budgets approved by the County assemblies are stable, though insufficient- both at National and at County Level</p> <p>NDMA relies on donor funding various activities, Drought Contingency Fund is purely a donor initiative and its growth depends on the prudent management and the commitment by government to allocate funds once the donor commitment ceases.</p> <p>The Special Programmes Directorate accesses funding from the national treasury for emergency response at National level. More often than not, this is done in parallel with county government interventions. There is need to work out modalities of how the two programmes can complement each other.</p> <p>Government commitment in terms of funding anti-drought activities is key and essential in the effort to ending droughts. Donor funding may not be sustainable or guaranteed for the future.</p>	2.1
3.a	What has been the level of resources for HSC in the past five years?	TBA	
3.b	What has been the share of resource requirements that has been covered in the past five years?	Approximately 60 percent of the requirements have been met over the past 2yrs of the County's existence.	
3.c	What has been the share of resources mobilized by national and county governments for these activities in the past five years?	The national and county government mobilized approx. 40 percent of the resources required for the activities over the past 2yrs.	
3.d	What are the prospects for each of these questions in the medium-term future?	Funding prospects for emergency preparedness and response activities remain insufficient in the medium term as no clear strategies to scale up the funding are in place....	
4.	Are there systems and resources available for civil society, communities, and private sector's participation in HSC management, and for monitoring and feedback at the national and county levels? Are these systems and resources sustainable? (CCC2)	<p>There are no mechanisms and resources at the county for the stakeholders' participation, except through the CSG that exists more on good will than anything else.</p> <p>Monitoring and feedback discussions are organized by NDMA or drought related interventions, but not well structured.</p>	2.0
5.	Does government lead the present system of HSC management? How? Does the present system rest on a secure (multiple-sourced) basis of resources, and are back-up plans in place, or does it depend on the goodwill of one or few external partners? (CCC3)	<p>The Government leads emergency response efforts through the CSG structure, working in established committees for different technical areas. NDMA plays a key role in drought related activities.</p> <p>Whereas the resource base would appear well diversified, through the active engagements with the civil society organizations, FBOs and INGOs, the system cannot be said to rest on a secure resource base- largely because the resources availed are inadequate to meet the needs at any given time.</p>	3.0
6.	Are civil society, communities and the private sector actively contributing resources and are they engaged in HSC management? Are mobilized resources and partnerships sustainable to plan, design and implement necessary activities? (CCC3)		2.0

7.	<b>How is information and analysis of HSC management and its results stored and accessed? Is this information available to government, the public and the international community (where appropriate)? (CCC4)</b>	<p>Whereas the County does not have a functioning integrated information system, NDMA documents and reports are stored online, and can be accessed therefrom. Hard copies can be requested from both NDMA and county government.</p> <p>Capacity enhancement towards the development of an information system is required to facilitate efficient communication.</p> <p>Drought monitoring mailing list is available for information sharing to all stakeholders at community and international community. The info is usually shared on the site. Drought response activities uploaded into the MIS each evening for all activities done at any given time. Storage and retrieval</p>	<b>2.0</b>
7.a	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the relevant authorities?	Though the CIDP discusses a monitoring and evaluation framework for the county, this has not been actualized hence M&E info is not efficiently disseminated to stakeholders.	
7.b	Are relevant monitoring reports disseminated to the general public?	Most reports are not shared to the general public, but are available on request from the County Offices.	
8.	<b>Has a flexible and strategic approach to work with the civil society, the communities and the private sector been developed to ensure their consistent participation and engagement in HSC management? Are these approaches sustainable? (CCC4)</b>	The Civil society, community and private sector has been engaged flexibly through the CSG. The capacity to engage effectively at the CSG needs to be assessed and strengthened. Role definitions and responsibilities needs to be looked into. The coordination organ should be structured and formalized with clear visions, missions and goals.	<b>3.5</b>
9.	<b>Is HSC management performance monitored? Are challenges/potential failures of the HSC management system identified, are they discussed and are lessons learned to improve the system? Can you provide examples? (CCC4)</b>	<p>The county government HSC is not monitored, for purposes of response evaluation. The HSC is subject to audit processes, as the currently recognized evaluation modality. M&amp;E of the HSC needs to be done prudently at the end of each response, given that certain issues may not be captured by the audit. Current WFP interventions such as FFA &amp; SMP are well monitored unlike the rest of the interventions being implemented by the county government. The opportunities for learning and improvement are lost because the structure is such that no forums are available to generate and review lessons learnt. Last mile data is also unavailable as a result of the set up. More needs to be done to address this grey area.</p> <p>The CIDP foresees the establishment of an M&amp;E unit and discusses a framework in relation thereto, but no progress has been made in this direction so far.</p>	<b>1.5</b>
10.	<b>Do the civil society, communities and the private sector contribute to the county's and sub-county's learning and to incorporating lessons learned and good practices to sustain HSC management? (CCC5)</b>	<p>There is effort by the stakeholders, but much more is required to enhance learning and improvement of emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>Feedback mechanisms need to be strengthened so as to inform future programming of emergency preparedness and response activities.</p> <p>More civic education needs to be carried out in order to get community engagement and feedback related to emergency preparedness and response. More learning events and sensitization needs to be organized on various aspects of the projects.</p>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Aggregate score for HGI 5:</b>			<b>2.5</b>





**BARINGO COUNTY**

Capacity Gaps and Needs Assessment  
for Food Security Safety Nets and Emergency  
Preparedness and Response

